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THE STRICT LIABILITY IN FAULT 
AND THE FAULT IN STRICT LIABILITY 
John C.P. Goldberg* & Benjamin C. Zipursky** 
 
Tort scholars have long been obsessed with the dichotomy between strict 
liability and liability based on fault or wrongdoing.  We argue that this is a 
false dichotomy.  Torts such as battery, libel, negligence, and nuisance are 
wrongs, yet all are “strictly” defined in the sense of setting objective and 
thus quite demanding standards of conduct.  We explain this basic insight 
under the heading of “the strict liability in fault.”  We then turn to the 
special case of liability for abnormally dangerous activities, which at times 
really does involve liability without wrongdoing.  Through an examination 
of this odd corner of tort law, we isolate “the fault in strict liability”—that 
is, the fault line between the wrongs-based form of strict liability that is 
frequently an aspect of tort liability and the wrongs-free form of strict 
liability that is found only within the very narrow domain of liability for 
abnormally dangerous activities.  We conclude by defending these two 
features of the common law of tort:  the strictness of the terms on which it 
defines wrongdoing and its begrudging willingness to recognize, in one 
special kind of case, liability without wrongdoing. 
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INTRODUCTION 
No topic has received more attention in modern torts scholarship than the 
distinction between strict liability and fault-based liability.  Legal historians 
have debated the provenance and significance of each.1  Doctrinalists have 
fought over whether negligence liability is actually strict and whether strict 
products liability is actually fault-based.2  Economists have argued about 
the incentive effects of these different modes of liability.3  Philosophers 
have pondered the extent to which strict or fault-based liability is 
compatible with, or required by, moral principles.4 
In this Article, we argue that, notwithstanding all the attention it has 
received, standard invocations of the fault v. strict liability distinction badly 
mischaracterize it, which in turn has caused a great deal of needless 
confusion.  We aim to clear up the confusion by providing a more careful 
 
 1. See, e.g., MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780–
1860, at 70, 74–75 (1977) (arguing that, in the mid-nineteenth century, courts in the United 
States moved from a regime of strict tort liability to a regime of fault-based liability as a 
means of promoting nascent industry); Gary T. Schwartz, Tort Law and the Economy in 
Nineteenth-Century America:  A Reinterpretation, 90 YALE L.J. 1717 (1981) (responding to 
Horwitz). 
 2. See, e.g., Mark F. Grady, Res Ipsa Loquitur and Compliance Error, 142 U. PA. L. 
REV. 887, 897–98 (1994) (arguing that, as applied in particular instances, negligence 
generates strict forms of liability); James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Doctrinal 
Collapse in Products Liability:  The Empty Shell of Failure to Warn, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 265, 
272 (1990) (arguing that liability for injuries caused by dangerous products, even though 
nominally strict, is actually fault based). 
 3. See, e.g., Steven Shavell, Strict Liability Versus Negligence, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 2–3 
(1980) (discussing the issue). 
 4. See, e.g., ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW 177–79 (1995) (arguing 
that strict liability is unprincipled); Tony Honoré, Responsibility and Luck:  The Moral Basis 
of Strict Liability, 104 LAW Q. REV. 530, 539–52 (1988) (arguing for the morality of strict 
liability). 
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analysis of the role of fault-based liability and strict liability in the law of 
torts. 
According to prevailing academic usage, strict liability is liability without 
wrongdoing.  A defendant subject to strict liability must pay damages 
irrespective of whether she has met, or failed to meet, an applicable 
standard of conduct.  Action that causes harm is all that is required.  By 
contrast, fault-based liability is conceived as liability predicated on some 
sort of wrongdoing.  The defendant’s liability rests on the defendant having 
been “at fault,” i.e., having failed to act as required. 
This treatment of strict and fault-based liability as opposites is a 
monumental mistake.  In fact, tort liability is almost always simultaneously 
fault-based and strict. For torts ranging from battery to negligence, and 
from libel to trespass, liability is imposed on the basis of wrongdoing.  Yet, 
it is also imposed strictly—that is, in a demanding or unforgiving manner.  
As the first half of our title suggests, there is strict liability in fault. 
While we insist that strict liability appears throughout tort law because of 
the manner in which courts have defined the various torts, we also 
acknowledge that there are marginal instances in which courts recognize 
tort liability without any wrongdoing.  This form of liability can fairly—
though not uncontroversially—be traced to the old English case of Rylands 
v. Fletcher5 and today can be found in applications of the “abnormally 
dangerous activities” doctrine that grew out of Rylands.  Conventional 
wisdom errs in large part because it treats every instance of strict tort 
liability as an instance of the type of liability commonly associated with 
Rylands, when in fact that type is quite distinct from what we have just 
described as “the strict liability in fault.”  Thus, to invoke the second half of 
our title, it is critical to appreciate the fault in strict liability—that is, the 
difference between two very different kinds of strict liability, one of which 
is pervasive and the other of which is an outlier in tort law.  The former, 
noted above, is an attribute of the standards of conduct contained within the 
various torts.  The latter imposes liability without regard to whether a 
standard of conduct has been met or violated. 
Our analysis proceeds as follows.  Part I discusses the strict liability in 
fault.  Specifically, it demonstrates that there are common instances of strict 
liability in negligence, battery, trespass, nuisance, libel, and other torts.  
Because the standards of conduct built into these torts are defined 
objectively, they are often quite demanding or unforgiving.  Nonetheless, as 
we explain, objectivity-based strict liability of this sort is still wrongs-
based.  To say the same thing:  demanding standards of conduct are still 
standards of conduct, and violations of them are still cogently described as 
wrongs. 
 
 5. (1868) 3 LRE & I App. 330 (HL).  As explained below, there are reasons to believe 
that Rylands embraced the distinct form of strict liability that we refer to below as 
“licensing-based strict liability.” See infra Part II.  However, later English decisions have 
rejected this reading of Rylands, instead treating it as a nuisance case.  Regardless, the 
abnormally dangerous activities doctrine that Rylands helped spawn, at least in some 
applications, involves the imposition of licensing-based strict liability. 
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Part II turns to the fault in strict liability.  Specifically, it explains how 
liability for injuries resulting from abnormally dangerous activities can, at 
least sometimes, be understood as a distinctive form of strict liability that 
detaches liability from any notion of wrongdoing. We refer to this special, 
non-wrongs-based form of strict liability as licensing-based strict liability.  
This part concludes by rebutting arguments suggesting that licensing-based 
strict liability is, after all, a form of wrongs-based liability. 
Part III identifies and responds to several challenges that might be raised 
against our map of the terrain of tort law.  First, it explains why the 
recognition of “strict” products liability by U.S. courts in the second half of 
the twentieth century does nothing to undermine our contention that strict 
liability in tort is overwhelmingly wrongs-based and that licensing-based 
strict liability is anomalous.  Second, it counters the suggestion that the 
strictness of tort law’s standards of conduct renders tort law normatively 
indefensible or unattractive.  Third, it explains why, even granting that 
liability without any wrongdoing is imposed for injuries caused by 
abnormally dangerous activities, there are plausible reasons for categorizing 
this particular form of liability as “tort” liability.  Finally, we consider 
whether, in recognizing licensing-based strict liability at the very margins 
of tort law, courts have drawn the fault line between the two forms of strict 
liability in a defensible place, or whether they would do well to recognize 
more instances of licensing-based strict liability. 
We conclude with some thoughts about possible practical implications of 
our analysis. 
I.  THE STRICT LIABILITY IN FAULT 
Torts are wrongs, and tort suits turn on claims of wrongdoing.  However, 
tort law defines wrongdoing in ways that allow for the imposition of 
liability even upon actors who act with reasonable care or diligence.  This 
aspect of tort law is what we refer to as “the strict liability in fault.”  This 
part demonstrates that this form of strict liability is pervasive in tort and 
explains its cogency within a law of wrongs. 
A.  Tort Law’s Strict Liability Wrongs 
This section briefly surveys instances in which torts that condition 
liability on wrongdoing nonetheless operate strictly. 
1.  Negligence and the Objectivity of the Standard of Care 
Negligence has long been defined in a manner that is relatively 
insensitive to the ability of particular persons to act with ordinary prudence.  
Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. famously focused on negligence law’s 
indifference to an actor’s actual ability to remain free of calamities.6  The 
law, he rightly noted, applies the same standard to the competent and the 
 
 6. OLIVER W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW (The Lawbook Exch., Ltd. 2009) 
(1881). 
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incompetent, even though the latter will find it difficult or impossible to 
comply, or at least to comply consistently.7 
Negligence law’s indifference to an actor’s capacity for prudence is not 
the only way in which it sets an unforgiving norm.  As Mark Grady 
famously emphasized, courts apply the standard of care using a relatively 
narrow time horizon.8  The breach question within a negligence claim 
concerns whether an actor has failed to meet the standard on a particular 
occasion—whether a driver who collides his car with another car failed to 
check his blind spot before changing lanes, or whether a surgeon properly 
performed a procedure on a particular patient.  One’s overall record for 
prudence—the fact that one is generally a very careful driver or surgeon—is 
irrelevant.  Over a long enough stretch of time it may be nearly impossible 
for drivers, surgeons, and other actors to meet the standard on every 
occasion on which they are required to meet it. 
Likewise, negligence law makes little to no room for excuses.9  An actor 
whose actions fail to meet the standard of ordinary prudence will be subject 
to liability even if her carelessness results from pressures that would induce 
even a resilient person to act carelessly.  Suppose, for example, a patient 
leaves her physician’s office devastated over receiving a terrible diagnosis.  
Reeling, she fails to pay attention to her surroundings and takes a step out 
into a street against a “Don’t Walk” sign, colliding with a bicycle that is 
proceeding lawfully down the street.  If the cyclist is injured, he will have a 
claim against the patient.  In this way, too, negligence law is quite 
demanding. 
In sum, the standard of conduct built into the tort of negligence is strict.  
Holmes and others have pointed to this feature of negligence law as proof 
that tort law, for instrumental reasons, imposes liability beyond what would 
be permitted if the law were to insist on wrongdoing as a condition of 
liability.10  But it is a mistake to infer from the demandingness of the 
reasonably prudent person standard to the conclusion that negligence law 
calls for liability without wrongdoing.  The clumsy injurer, the physician 
with the otherwise spotless record, and the distracted patient can each point 
to a ground that might warrant a relatively lenient judgment of their actions.  
Yet it remains perfectly cogent to criticize their actions as substandard.  
 
 7. Id. 
If . . . a man is born hasty and awkward, is always having accidents and hurting 
himself or his neighbors, no doubt his congenital defects will be allowed for in the 
courts of Heaven, but his slips are no less troublesome to his neighbors than if they 
sprang from guilty neglect.  His neighbors accordingly require him, at his proper 
peril, to come up to their standard, and the courts which they establish decline to 
take his personal equation into account. 
Id. at 108. 
 8. Grady, supra note 2, at 900 (noting that judges do not take into account the cost to 
actors of consistently meeting the standard of care, thereby in effect “assess[ing] a penalty 
for every miss”). 
 9. See John C.P. Goldberg, Inexcusable Wrongs, 103 CALIF. L. REV. 467, 467 (2015). 
 10. See, e.g., Kenneth S. Abraham, Strict Liability in Negligence, 61 DEPAUL L. REV. 
271, 273 (2012) (arguing that negligence law’s pockets of strict liability indicate that 
negligence liability extends past cases of genuine wrongdoing). 
748 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85 
Each of these envisioned cases of “strict” negligence liability stands in 
contrast to a case in which a person causes injury through conduct that fully 
complies with the applicable standard and hence is in no sense wrongful.11  
Negligence, in many standard iterations, is a strict liability wrong. 
2.  Trespass, Battery, and Defamation: 
Rights and Act-Types 
For centuries the term “trespass” was used to refer to the branch of law 
now known as “tort.”  Trespass to land was one instantiation of the general 
idea.  Trespass to the person (battery) was another.  The idea of crossing 
another’s boundaries—of touching another inappropriately, or of “breaking 
the close”—powerfully conveys the notion of one person wrongfully 
injuring another.  Yet the old trespassory torts were defined, and their 
modern descendants are still defined, in a way that allows for the imposition 
of liability notwithstanding the defendant’s diligence or prudence. 
To take a well-worn example:  one who takes extraordinary care to build 
a fence on her property but who nonetheless ends up building it on a 
neighbor’s property commits trespass to land.12  That she took every 
reasonable precaution against invading her neighbor’s land (short of not 
building) does not defeat the neighbor’s claim.  Indeed, the neighbor 
typically is entitled to have the fence taken down and to recover damages 
for any harm incurred as a result of its being built.   
The tort of trespass is rights driven in an unusually conspicuous way.  
The possessor’s right to exclude persons and objects goes a long way 
toward defining what constitutes wrongful conduct in relation to that right.  
So long as there has been the requisite invasion, the wrong has been 
committed.  In other words, the plaintiff’s property rights generate a wrong 
that is defined in terms of a certain act-type.  It is enough that, (a) the 
defendant actually enters (or remains on) land that is possessed by the 
plaintiff and (b) that the defendant intended to occupy the physical space 
that, when occupied, constituted the entry (or the remaining on).  One who 
intends to make contact with, or pass through or over, a particular physical 
space that happens to be another’s, and who does so, has trespassed.  This is 
so even if she did not know, and had no reason to know, that the land was 
possessed by another. 
As our pairing of trespass to land with battery is meant to suggest, the 
former is hardly an outlier.  Today, battery is categorized as an intentional 
tort.  This unfortunate bit of taxonomy—a misguided outgrowth of efforts 
after the collapse of the writ system to reorganize tort law on something 
akin to a mens rea spectrum—is misleading.13  In particular, it invites one 
 
 11. For example, a pedestrian who, despite proceeding with due care for those around 
her, knocks down another pedestrian. 
 12. Burns Philp Food, Inc. v. Cavalea Cont’l Freight, Inc., 135 F.3d 526, 529 (7th Cir. 
1998) (“Trespass is a strict liability tort . . . .”). 
 13. John C.P. Goldberg, Ten Half-Truths About Tort Law, 42 VAL. L. REV. 1221, 1259 
(2008). 
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to think of battery as a high-culpability tort:  the civil analogue to a criminal 
assault.  Of course, criminal assaults are tortious batteries.  But shootings 
and beatings hardly exhaust the reach of the tort. 
To commit battery is to touch another person in an impermissible 
manner.  So defined, battery allows for liability despite the defendant’s 
having taken care not to injure the plaintiff.  The right in battery is closely 
akin to the right in trespass.  Each of us is entitled to be free from certain 
touchings; this entitlement corresponds with a legal directive to others in 
the form of “Don’t touch!” (or “Keep off!”). 
To be sure, the wrong of battery is defined slightly more narrowly than 
the wrong of trespass.  In the latter, the relevant act-type is the intentional 
touching of land.  In battery, the relevant act-type is the intentional touching 
of another person in an unacceptable manner.  Unintentional contact cannot 
be a battery.  Nor is it a battery for one person intentionally to touch another 
in an acceptable manner—the proverbial tap on the shoulder to ask for 
directions.  But so long as one intends a touching of an unacceptable sort 
and then performs it, one has committed a battery—irrespective of whether 
one appreciates the impermissibility of the touching and, much less, 
whether one intends harm. 
Perhaps the leading American battery decision—Vosburg v. Putney14—
speaks to the potential strictness of battery liability.  A schoolboy reached 
his leg across the classroom aisle and struck his classmate’s shin with his 
foot, possibly to get the classmate’s attention.  The kick left no mark.  
Indeed, Vosburg, the victim, initially did not feel its impact.  However, 
moments later he experienced severe pain; apparently the kick aggravated 
an underlying condition in his leg.15  The defendant, Putney, denied any 
intent to cause harm and the Wisconsin Supreme Court accepted his denial 
for purposes of analysis.16 
Vosburg’s battery suit alleged that Putney’s kick, in combination with the 
preexisting condition, caused permanent damage.  Although the court had 
some doubts about the plaintiff’s efforts to prove a link between the kick 
and the permanent injury, it had no trouble concluding that the defendant 
had committed a battery.  It focused on the act-type—a kick.  There was no 
dispute that the defendant performed the kick intentionally, which is all that 
was needed for the defendant to be subject to liability for battery.17  Absent 
 
 14. 50 N.W. 403 (Wisc. 1891). 
 15. Id. at 404. 
 16. Id. at 403–04. 
 17. Id. 
The jury having found that the defendant, in touching the plaintiff with his foot, 
did not intend to do him any harm, counsel for defendant maintain that the plaintiff 
has no cause of action, and that defendant’s motion for judgment on the special 
verdict should have been granted.  In support of this proposition counsel 
quote . . . the rule that “the intention to do harm is of the essence of an assault.”  
Such is the rule, no doubt, in actions or prosecutions for mere assaults.  But this is 
an action to recover damages for an alleged assault and battery.  In such case the 
rule is correctly stated, in many of the authorities cited by counsel, that plaintiff 
must show either that the intention was unlawful, or that the defendant is in fault.  
If the intended act is unlawful, the intention to commit it must necessarily be 
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special circumstances, an intentional tap on the shoulder is not a battery 
because there is nothing inappropriate or unacceptable about that way of 
touching another.  By contrast, there is something wrong about kicking 
another, even gently.  Parents teach their children not to kick others—that it 
is wrong.  Teachers tell their students that kicking is not allowed and that it 
will lead to discipline.  In short, a kick is a form of touching that, in most 
settings, is not to be done. 
It might be tempting to suppose that the Wisconsin court was prepared to 
find “fault” with Putney in his flouting of school rules.  Yet, the court 
nowhere suggested that Putney’s disposition toward the rule against kicking 
in the classroom was relevant to liability.  In this respect, Vosburg is 
consistent with decisions holding that battery liability can attach without 
conscious rule breaking.  Indeed, it is a familiar bit of black letter law that a 
tort defendant cannot defeat a battery allegation, as a criminal defendant 
might defeat a prosecution, by establishing that he was incapable of 
appreciating the wrongfulness of his actions because of a mental illness.18  
If the defendant is capable of forming an intention to perform the relevant 
act-type—so long as he actually meant to hit, kick, grope, spit on, or 
otherwise touch another person in a manner regarded as improper—he is 
subject to liability.19  Likewise, liability can even attach if the defendant 
reasonably but mistakenly believed that he was touching the plaintiff in an 
acceptable manner.20  Neither conscious awareness of rule breaking nor 
unreasonable conduct is necessary for battery. 
Certain defenses to battery are arguably also defined in a way that 
renders liability for this tort strict.  For example, according to the Second 
Restatement of Torts, a defendant may face battery liability even if she had 
good reason to believe that the plaintiff consented to being touched in what 
would otherwise be an inappropriate manner.21  For a defendant to benefit 
from the doctrine of apparent consent, her mistake as to consent must not 
only be reasonable, but must also have been generated by something that 
the plaintiff said or did (or failed to say or do in a situation in which there is 
an expectation that something would have been said or done).  An actor 
 
unlawful.  Hence, as applied to this case, if the kicking of the plaintiff by the 
defendant was an unlawful act, the intention of defendant to kick him was also 
unlawful. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
 18. See Wagner v. State, 122 P.3d 599, 609–10 (Utah 2005) (“[A]s long as a person, 
mentally handicapped or not, intended to touch the person of another, and the touch was a 
harmful or offensive one at law, he has committed a battery, . . . it is not an element of 
[battery] that the actor appreciate that the contact is unwanted.”). 
 19. Thus, no battery liability should attach if a delusional defendant attacks another 
person in the genuine belief that he is attacking a plant. 
 20. See White v. Univ. of Idaho, 797 P.2d 108 (Idaho 1990). Defendant, a longtime 
acquaintance of plaintiff with whom he shared an interest in piano, was a social guest in 
plaintiff’s home.  While plaintiff was seated, defendant approached her from behind and 
touched her back with his fingers, mimicking the motions of a pianist touching a keyboard, 
thereby unexpectedly causing her physical harm.  The court concluded that this touching 
constituted a battery, endorsing a lower court’s assertion that “the intent required for the 
commission of a battery is simply the intent to cause an unpermitted contact.” Id. at 109. 
 21. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 50, 892(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1977). 
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who, based on the mistaken representation of a third-party, had every 
reason to suppose that the plaintiff consented to being touched, is subject to 
liability for battery. 
The defamation torts—or at least central instances of libel and slander—
have the same structure as battery and trespass.  The right in defamation is 
the right to one’s good name.  The corresponding wrong involves 
intentionally publishing the kind of statement or depiction that will tend to 
injure a person’s reputation and thereby causes such an injury.  In other 
words, the act-type is that of communicating something of a defamatory 
nature about another.  As a matter of common law,22 so long as one 
intentionally makes such a statement, and reputational harm follows, there 
can be liability.  The gist of the wrong has nothing to do with fault in the 
sense of a lack of diligence or prudence. 
Indeed, under common law, so long as the defendant intentionally uttered 
a statement that reasonably could be understood to refer to the plaintiff, and 
that reasonably could be construed as defamatory of her, the defendant was 
subject to liability.  This was the upshot of Justice Holmes’s opinion for the 
U.S. Supreme Court in Peck v. Tribune Co.23  There, the defendant ran an 
advertisement in its newspaper.  The advertisement included a picture of the 
plaintiff, wrongly identified as “Mrs. A. Schuman,” and falsely describing 
her as one of Chicago’s “most capable and experienced nurses.”24  It further 
included a statement from “Mrs. Schuman” extolling the health benefits of 
defendant’s whisky.25 
Plaintiff alleged that she was libeled by the advertisement because it 
identified her as a nurse who regularly consumed whisky.  The Court 
permitted the claim to go to the jury.  First, it reasoned that even if the 
picture of the plaintiff had been inserted into the advertisement by mistake, 
the picture together with the text of the advertisement constituted a 
statement “of and concerning” the plaintiff.26  The fact that the defendant 
did not intend to make a statement about the plaintiff was irrelevant—it was 
enough that the statement reasonably could be interpreted to be a statement 
about her.27  Second, the Court held that a jury could deem it defamatory to 
say of someone that she is a nurse who partakes of whisky, even if the 
statement was not intended to be defamatory by the defendant and even if, 
for many viewers of the advertisement, the statement would not change 
their opinion of the plaintiff.28 
 
 22. Of course, since New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), the common law 
of defamation has been subjected to various constitutional limitations. 
 23. 214 U.S. 185 (1909). 
 24. Id. at 188. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. at 189. 
 27. Said Holmes for the Court:  “If the publication was libellous the defendant took the 
risk.” Id.  In other words, a person who publishes a statement that, by its content, carries the 
potential to defame someone takes the risk that the statement will reasonably be construed as 
referring to, and defamatory of, a particular person. 
 28. Id. at 190. 
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As described in Peck, the tort of libel subjects to liability a person who 
intentionally publishes a statement that can plausibly be understood by a 
respectable portion of the community as defamatory of the plaintiff.29  
Diligence on the part of the publisher—for example, taking steps to avoid 
saying something about the plaintiff or to avoid saying something 
defamatory about her—does not defeat liability.  That common law 
defamation could amount to a strict liability wrong would eventually prove 
to be of great concern to Holmes’s successors on the Court.  Indeed, it was 
in part this aspect of defamation law that fueled the Court’s recognition of 
fault as a constitutional requirement in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.30  And 
yet, even before Gertz, in their stricter incarnations, libel and slander were 
understood to be wrongs. 
3.  Nuisance:  Out-of-Place Uses 
It is no accident that Morton Horwitz placed nuisance law at the center of 
his effort to establish that pre-nineteenth-century tort law was dominated by 
a rule of strict liability.31  Likewise, it is no accident that Ronald Coase 
relied on nuisance cases in articulating his efficiency-driven approach to the 
analysis of tort liability.32  Each rightly perceived that nuisance liability is 
in some sense strict.  Yet both were mistaken in supposing that nuisance 
liability is strict in the sense of not requiring wrongdoing.  The familiar 
English case of Sturges v. Bridgman33 can help capture the breadth and 
distinctiveness of the wrong of nuisance.34 
Plaintiff, a doctor, owned a residence that shared a wall with a building 
occupied by the defendant confectioner.  A conflict arose when the doctor 
converted what had been a garden in the rear of his residence into a 
consulting room.  The new west wall of the consulting room was built 
against the rear wall of the defendant’s kitchen.  Into that rear wall the 
defendant had set two mortars (stone bowls).  Employees placed foodstuffs 
in the mortars, then pounded them with large wooden pestles housed within 
brackets that were also attached to the wall.  Although the use of the 
mortars had not previously disturbed users of the garden, Sturges offered 
evidence that the pounding and scraping noises seriously interfered with his 
use of his consulting room and would similarly interfere with standard 
residential uses of the room.35   
 
 29. Id. at 189. 
 30. 418 U.S. 323 (1974); see id. at 347 (“We hold that, so long as they do not impose 
liability without fault, the States may define for themselves the appropriate standard of 
liability for a publisher . . . of a defamatory falsehood injurious to a private individual.”). 
 31. HORWITZ, supra note 1, at 70, 74–75. 
 32. A.W. Brian Simpson, Coase v. Pigou Reexamined, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 53, 54 (1996) 
(emphasizing Coase’s use of nuisance cases); Henry E. Smith, Exclusion and Property Rules 
in the Law of Nuisance, 90 VA. L. REV. 965, 966 (2004) (same). 
 33. (1879) 11 Ch D 852 (Eng.). 
 34. For background, see A.W. Brian Simpson, The Story of Sturges v. Bridgman:  The 
Resolution of Land Use Disputes Between Neighbors, in PROPERTY STORIES 11 (Gerald 
Korngold & Andrew P. Morriss eds., 2d ed. 2009). 
 35. See id. at 16–17. 
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The opinion of the Court of Appeals in Sturges is primarily concerned 
with the question of whether the plaintiff and prior possessors of the 
residence had acquiesced to the defendant’s use of the mortars.  Implicit in 
the framing of this question is the conclusion, apparently uncontested, that 
the confectioner’s use of the mortars otherwise would constitute an 
actionable nuisance—an unreasonable interference with the plaintiff’s use 
and enjoyment of his property.36 
It is difficult to see in what sense the defendant in Sturges acted 
unreasonably:  the defendant’s business was appropriate to the 
neighborhood, the use of noisy equipment in such a business was 
apparently commonplace, there is no suggestion that the defendant set up or 
used his equipment in a dangerous manner, the defendant even appears to 
have made reasonable efforts to accommodate his neighbor.37  In short, 
there is no fault in Sturges, if by fault one means a failure to take reasonable 
care to avoid interfering with the interests of the plaintiff.38  Yet liability 
attached and the defendant was enjoined from operating the mortars along 
the establishment’s rear wall.39 
As with trespass to land, nuisance starts with the idea of the possessor’s 
right or entitlement to exclude.40  In trespass, the entitlement is to exclude 
persons and objects from entering.  In nuisance, the entitlement is primarily 
to exclude odors, noises, and vibrations.41  In this respect, a nuisance, like a 
trespass, is ordinarily an invasion of one’s property by another.42  However, 
there are key differences between the two wrongs.  For liability, trespass 
simultaneously requires more by way of intent and less by way of injury.  
These two differences are related.  A trespass is a deliberate occupation of 
land.  If there is no intent to occupy a particular space, there is no 
 
 36. Simpson, supra note 34, at 37 (noting that there was no dispute of the evidence of 
the interference, and no serious dispute that, absent a finding of acquiescence by the 
plaintiff, defendant’s use of the mortars constituted a nuisance); Smith, supra note 32, at 
1001 (noting that there was little if any dispute as to whether the defendant’s use of the 
mortars constituted a nuisance). 
 37. Simpson, supra note 34, at 32 (reporting that, in response to Sturges’s complaints, 
Bridgman limited the use of the mortars to certain times of day). 
 38. Smith, supra note 32, at 967–68 (noting and criticizing the tendency of certain 
economically oriented scholars to reduce nuisance to negligence). 
 39. Simpson, supra note 34, at 38, 41 (observing that the court did not enjoin the 
operation of the confectionery, but instead required the defendant to rearrange its equipment 
to lessen its impact on the plaintiff, and that the business continued to operate for several 
years after the litigation). 
 40. Smith, supra note 32, at 1002 (asserting that nuisance law operates from a baseline 
that grants property possessors a “strong default package of rights” to be free from invasions 
emanating from outside their properties). 
 41. Id. at 999–1000 (noting courts’ tendency to require invasions (or imminent 
invasions) as a prerequisite to nuisance liability). 
 42. Nuisance liability can sometimes attach to noninvasive activities.  For example, 
some courts have held that the operation of a funeral home in a residential neighborhood is a 
nuisance.  Professor Smith suggests that these are marginal cases. Id. 
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trespass.43  But any intentional occupation will suffice for trespass; even if 
it does not result in physical harm to the property. 
Nuisance lacks a comparable intent requirement and, in that sense, 
potentially reaches more conduct than trespass.  Even if a defendant does 
not intend for noise or odors emanating from his property to reach property 
owned by the plaintiff, if they actually reach the plaintiff’s property, they 
can provide the basis for a nuisance action.  However, de minimis invasions 
will not count as nuisances; rather, the interference must be unreasonable in 
the sense that it must substantially interfere with the plaintiff’s use and 
enjoyment.  The wrong of nuisance is objectively defined in that it turns on 
socially determined entitlements or baselines.  A possessor of property is 
expected to endure only so much by way of interference.  To say the same 
thing:  “Whether a use [of land] is reasonable or not depends on whether it 
interferes with the plaintiff’s use and enjoyment of his land to an extent 
beyond what any neighbor ought to bear.”44 
Importantly, the fact of significant interference is not enough.  The 
activity or condition generating the interference must also be out of place or 
inappropriate.  A homeowner with a fondness for hosting large dinner 
parties does nothing “wrong” by holding them.  Nonetheless, to avoid 
nuisance liability, he may have to observe certain restrictions on his 
activities, including taking steps to ensure that his guests’ comings and 
goings do not unduly disturb his neighbors.  To commit a nuisance is to act 
wrongfully by interfering seriously with another’s use of his property 
through a failure to tailor one’s activities on one’s own property in a 
manner appropriate to the use and location of the properties, the character 
of the neighborhood, and so forth.45 
B.  The Wrongfulness of Tort Law’s Strict Liability Wrongs 
Our brief review of the parameters of liability for negligence, trespass, 
battery, defamation, and nuisance has aimed to establish that tort liability 
often is imposed with substantial indifference to the ease or difficulty a 
defendant may have in complying with applicable standards.  Our point is 
partly Holmes’s:  that even earnest souls who make every effort to do the 
right thing can face liability.46  But it is also a broader and perhaps more 
troubling point:  the tendency among courts to understand and define 
tortious wrongdoing objectively often results in the imposition of liability 
even when the defendant has done all that he reasonably should have done 
 
 43. For example, a driver who loses control of his car and slides off a public road, 
crashing into the plaintiff’s fence, has not trespassed because the driver never intended to be 
there. 
 44. J.E. Penner, Nuisance and the Character of the Neighbourhood, 5 J. ENVTL. L. 1, 5 
(1993). 
 45. Smith, supra note 32, at 1003 (asserting that the threshold for substantial or 
unreasonable interference is sensitive to the character of the neighborhood in which the 
plaintiff’s property is located). 
 46. See supra notes 6–7 and accompanying text. 
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to avoid injuring the plaintiff.  We refer to this phenomenon as tort law’s 
recognition of “strict liability wrongs.”47 
Our use of this phrase is meant to be provocative.  Among the questions 
we expect it to provoke is the following:  Is there really a meaningful notion 
of “wrong” and “wrongdoing,” or are we just playing word games?  We 
have already begun to answer this question in the preceding discussions of 
particular torts, but it will be worthwhile to take a moment to address it 
more directly. 
It is cogent to speak of “strict liability wrongs” because, even when 
liability for negligence, trespass, battery, libel, or nuisance is strict, it is still 
predicated on the defendant’s having violated a standard of conduct.  For 
example, negligence is defined as the injuring of another through conduct 
that is careless as to that other.48  Liability for negligence does not attach 
unless the defendant failed to meet the standard of care.  As we have seen, 
there will be occasions on which a given defendant will have little ability to 
meet this standard.  But this does not mean that there is no standard, nor 
that the conduct somehow satisfies that standard.  To use a variant on Jules 
Coleman’s helpful phraseology, there is a wrong in the doing, even if not a 
wrong in the doer.49 
What is true for negligence is true for tort law’s other strict liability 
wrongs.  A constituent of the basis for liability is some defect in the 
defendant’s action beyond the mere fact of having caused injury.  In 
trespass, there must be an intentional occupation of physical space 
possessed by another.  In battery, there must be an intentional touching of 
an inappropriate sort.  In nuisance, there must be a use of land that is out of 
place, and so forth.  As we will see below, each of these instances stands in 
contrast to the idea of strict liability without wrongdoing.50 
In sum, each wrongs-based tort contains a rule that sets a standard of 
conduct by identifying a way of acting upon another that one is enjoined 
from doing.  One is not to defame another, one is not to batter another, one 
is not to inflict a physical injury upon another through carelessness, and so 
 
 47. Cf. Gregory C. Keating, Strict Liability Wrongs, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF 
THE LAW OF TORTS 292 (John Oberdiek ed., 2014).  Our usage of the phrase “strict liability 
wrongs” diverges in important respects from Professor Keating’s. 
 48. DAN B. DOBBS, PAUL T. HAYDEN & ELLEN M. BUBLICK, HORNBOOK ON TORTS § 9.5 
(2d ed. 2016) (listing the elements of negligence). 
 49. JULES L. COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS 333 (1992).  Coleman refers to “fault” 
rather than “wrong.”  We use “wrong” because our core claim is that tort law recognizes 
faultless wrongs. 
 50. Vicarious liability in tort only magnifies the requirement of a wrongdoing for tort 
liability.  For example, respondeat superior operates to hold employers strictly accountable 
for certain wrongs committed by their employees.  One could imagine a non-wrongs-based 
licensing scheme under which employers would be permitted to operate their businesses only 
on the condition that they make good the losses caused by their operations.  But, of course 
this is not how respondeat superior works.  It instead presupposes the commission by an 
employee of an employment-related wrong and then expands the set of actors who can be 
held accountable for that wrong.  Broad domains of vicarious liability, see, e.g., Taber v. 
Maine, 67 F.3d 1029 (2d Cir. 1995), do not relax the requirement of wrongdoing; they relax 
principles of agency or attribution.  Tort law’s vicarious liability doctrines are but another 
respect in which tort is strict in its imposition of liability for wrongs. 
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on.  For each of the wrongs of tort law, we might imagine the defendant 
asking the plaintiff:  “I grant that my actions caused you harm, but what did 
I do wrong?”  And for each we can imagine an answer from the plaintiff of 
the following form:  “You built on my land,” “you called me a thief,” “you 
caressed me without permission,” “you glanced away from the road and 
drove right into me.”  These are all responses that identify an act that one 
can understand as having contravened a norm of conduct.  The issue of 
whether the act in question contravened a legal norm of conduct is distinct 
from the issue of whether the actor is culpable for having performed it.  In 
each case, there is an act that the defendant might not have done and might 
have successfully avoided by complying with a relevant norm of conduct 
supplied by tort law. 
It is sometimes said that torts such as negligence, battery, trespass, 
defamation, and nuisance contain “pockets” of strict liability.51  Insofar as 
this usage suggests that each of these torts has a wrongs-based core 
surrounded by a penumbra of non-wrongs-based liability rules, it is 
mistaken.  Take battery, for example.  It is not as if certain batteries are 
wrongs, whereas others are not.  A battery, so far as tort law is concerned, is 
always a wrong.  It is always a violation of the directive to refrain from 
intentionally performing act-types that involve the inappropriate touching 
of another. 
As we have noted elsewhere, the directives of tort law impose a special 
kind of duty—namely, a duty not to injure others, as opposed to a duty to 
refrain from acting in a manner that carries with it the potentiality of 
injuring others.52  In other words, tort duties are defined such that they 
cannot be violated until there has been an injury.  Yet, at the same time, tort 
law also requires that the injury must have been brought about by action of 
a particular kind.  It does not require that we avoid injuring others, full stop.  
It requires us to avoid injuring others through the violation of certain norms 
of conduct.  For example, even though the tort of negligence, taken as a 
whole, establishes a duty of noninjury that, by definition, can only be 
breached when an injury occurs, that duty incorporates a subduty of 
noninjuriousness that guides conduct—i.e., the subduty of taking due care 
to another.  To say that this subduty is a duty of noninjuriousness is in part 
to say that, unlike the overall duty recognized by negligence law, it can be 
breached even before an injury occurs.  Other torts similarly are defined in 
terms of duties of noninjury that incorporate and are qualified by subduties 
of noninjuriousness. 
One might imagine a body of injury law that contains no subduties of 
noninjuriousness and hence no conduct-guiding directives.  Such a legal 
system would deem a person liable for causing injury to another 
irrespective of whether the person’s conduct was in any sense deficient or 
defective.  Relative to this imagined body of law, tort law’s rules are less 
 
 51. Abraham, supra note 10, at 272 & n.6 (citing scholars who refer to “pockets” of 
strict liability in negligence). 
 52. John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Torts as Wrongs, 88 TEX. L. REV. 917, 
941–45 (2010). 
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strict.  They hinge liability not merely on injury, but on injury that is the 
realization of misconduct.  As we have discussed, it is a mistake to suppose 
that tort law’s guidance rules are defined in such a way that they can always 
be satisfied by conduct that is diligent, reasonable, or done in good faith.  
Still, it is important to avoid overreacting to this mistake by reverting to the 
view that the qualifiers built into tort law’s duties of noninjury are empty.  
The norms of tort law simultaneously serve as bases for determining 
whether a plaintiff’s rights have been violated and as standards of conduct. 
II.  THE FAULT IN STRICT LIABILITY 
Particular torts are defined in a sharp-edged manner—a quality that is 
sometimes expressed by reference to the “objectivity” of the standards of 
conduct that they set.  The objective dimension of familiar torts often has 
been understood to indicate an embrace of liability beyond wrongdoing.  
But this understanding is mistaken.  Overwhelmingly, tort liability is 
simultaneously wrongs based and strict. 
Still, there is arguably a small corner of tort law that recognizes a form of 
strict liability that does not require wrongdoing in any sense.  In this 
section, we identify this form of strict liability, explain its normative 
structure, and contrast it with wrongs-based strict liability. 
A.  Rylands v. Fletcher 
and Abnormally Dangerous Activities 
Each of the three Restatements of tort law has recognized a special 
domain of strict liability under the labels “ultrahazardous” or “abnormally 
dangerous” activities.53  This domain is quite narrow, applying only to 
injuries caused by blasting, escaped wild animals, bursting reservoirs, and a 
few other activities.  Plaintiffs’ lawyers, courts, and commentators have at 
times suggested that the particular form of liability that attaches to 
abnormally dangerous activities should occupy more of the torts landscape.  
But no such expansion has occurred.  Indeed, the provisions of the Third 
Torts Restatement pertaining to physical harm cover much the same terrain 
as those of their predecessor Restatements.54  This form of strict liability is 
reserved only for the exceptional case of injuries caused to bystanders (and 
their property) by a short list of activities. 
Lord Cairns’s opinion in Rylands v. Fletcher55—the famous case of the 
bursting reservoir—is understandably regarded as a canonical articulation 
of the rationales of strict liability for abnormally dangerous activities: 
[T]he principles on which this case must be determined appear to me to be 
extremely simple.  The Defendants, treating them as the owners or 
 
 53. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL 
HARM §§ 20–23 (AM. LAW INST. 2010); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 519–520 (AM. 
LAW INST. 1977); RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 520 (AM. LAW INST. 1938). 
 54. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL 
HARM §§ 20–23. 
 55. (1868) 3 LRE & I App. 330 (HL). 
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occupiers of the close on which the reservoir was constructed, might 
lawfully have used that close for any purpose for which it might in the 
ordinary course of the enjoyment of land be used; and if, in what I may 
term the natural use[] of that land, there had been any accumulation of 
water, either on the surface or underground, and if, by the operation of the 
laws of nature, that accumulation of water had passed off into the close 
occupied by the Plaintiff, the Plaintiff could not have complained that that 
result had taken place.  If he had desired to guard himself against it, it 
would have lain upon him to have done so, by leaving, or by interposing, 
some barrier between his close and the close of the Defendants in order to 
have prevented that operation of the laws of nature. 
. . . . 
 On the other hand if the Defendants, not stopping at the natural use of 
their close, had desired to use it for any purpose which I may term a non-
natural use, for the purpose of introducing into the close that which in its 
natural condition was not in or upon it, for the purpose of introducing 
water either above or below ground in quantities and in a manner not the 
result of any work or operation on or under the land,—and if in 
consequence of their doing so, or in consequence of any imperfection in 
the mode of their doing so, the water came to escape and to pass off into 
the close of the Plaintiff, then it appears to me that that which the 
Defendants were doing they were doing at their own peril; and, if in the 
course of their doing it, the evil arose to which I have referred, the evil, 
namely, of the escape of the water and its passing away to the close of the 
Plaintiff and injuring the Plaintiff, then for the consequence of that, in my 
opinion, the Defendants would be liable.56 
Lord Cairns added that he “entirely concur[red]” with the opinion of 
Justice Blackburn, issued in the lower appellate court that had heard the 
case.57  Blackburn’s opinion reasoned that a person who, for his own 
purposes, stores a thing on his land that is well known for its propensity to 
escape and cause harm to his neighbors does so at his peril.58  Such a 
person, he concluded, is required to “make good the damage which ensues 
if he does not succeed in confining [the thing] to his own property.”59 
In his Rylands opinion, Lord Cairns did not so much argue for the 
liability of the defendant but rather classified the fact pattern as belonging 
to a type that obviously entails liability.  In particular, (1) he emphasized 
that there are certain “non-natural” uses of property that involve the 
bringing onto land of the kind of thing that is known to be prone to escape 
and invade neighboring property, even when care is taken to prevent 
escape; (2) he declared that a person who brings such a thing onto his land 
is answerable to one who suffers damage when the risk of escape and 
invasion is realized; and (3) he referred to the invasion itself as an “evil,” 
without any suggestion that the decision to bring the invading thing onto the 
land was itself wrongful or impermissible.60 
 
 56. Id. at 338–39. 
 57. Id. at 340. 
 58. Id. at 339. 
 59. Id. at 339–40 (quoting Justice Blackburn’s lower court opinion). 
 60. See id. 
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Rylands was preceded in England by two different kinds of authority—
one judicial and one legislative.  First, Lord Cairns accepted Justice 
Blackburn’s reliance on prior decisions that, for example, had imposed 
liability for escaping cattle that had eaten a neighbor’s crops, and for the 
failure of a privy that had resulted in filth invading a neighbor’s cellar. 
Second, as Brian Simpson famously demonstrated, there was a 
significant political and legislative backdrop to Rylands.61  Mid-nineteenth-
century England had seen at least two dam failures that resulted in hundreds 
of deaths and the destruction of entire villages.  The first of these, the 
Holmfirth disaster, occurred in 1852.62  The second—the failure of the Dale 
Dyke Embankment—occurred in 1864 during the pendency of the Rylands 
litigation.63 
In response to the earlier Holmfirth disaster, indemnity provisions known 
as “Holmfirth clauses” sometimes appeared in private bills authorizing 
particular dam-building projects.64  Such a clause was in fact contained in 
the 1853 bill that authorized the construction of the Dale Dyke 
Embankment.65  Thus the waterworks company that built that embankment 
was, under the terms of its authorizing statute, strictly liable for damages 
resulting from the catastrophic 1864 failure.  Following that second dam 
failure, Parliament considered general legislation that would have required 
companies that built dams for public reservoirs to be prepared to 
compensate victims for harm caused by dam failures, but that legislation 
stalled in committee.66 
The use of indemnity provisions in private bills authorizing dam 
constructions probably influenced the result in Rylands.  Justice Blackburn 
was clearly aware of them, having invited plaintiff’s counsel to address 
them in the course of oral argument.67  Moreover, Simpson’s research tells 
us that in 1864, Lord Cairns was retained by property owners who suffered 
losses in the Dale Dyke disaster, and he advised them that the Holmfirth 
clause in the 1853 authorizing bill entitled them to recover without proof of 
fault.68 
To be sure, neither Blackburn’s nor Cairns’s opinions overtly mention 
dam failures or indemnity clauses.  And Simpson is at his most speculative 
in suggesting that the two judges treated Rylands not so much as an 
occasion for the application of law to the dispute before them as an 
 
 61. See generally A.W. Brian Simpson, Legal Liability for Bursting Reservoirs:  The 
Historical Context of Rylands v. Fletcher, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 209 (1984). 
 62. Id. at 219. 
 63. Id. at 225. 
 64. Id. at 231–32. 
 65. Id. at 231. 
 66. Id. at 228–30. 
 67. Id. at 249. 
 68. Id. at 232.  Simpson also notes that lawyers representing Rylands and Fletcher in the 
appellate courts had previously appeared before a commission that Parliament had created to 
assess and allocate damages in connection with the Dale Dyke disaster.  The lawyers had 
argued over the question of whether the Holmfirth clause in the authorizing legislation for 
the Dale Dyke Embankment covered liability for pure economic loss, as opposed to personal 
injury and property damage. See id. at 234–37, 244. 
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opportunity to legislate from the bench to fill the gap left by Parliament’s 
failure to enact a generally applicable indemnification requirement for dam 
builders.69  Still, the notoriety of the dam failures surely enhanced the 
judges’ sense of the obviousness of the risks associated with storing large 
volumes of water.  More importantly, it seems plausible to suppose that 
Blackburn and Cairns saw a basic continuity between the precedents they 
cited and the emergence of Holmfirth clauses.  Relying on prior judicial 
decisions and then-recent legislative practice, they seem to have reasoned 
that a valuable activity—the storage of mass quantities of water in man-
made reservoirs—that carries with it an entirely familiar and serious risk of 
a harmful invasion of neighboring properties was appropriately subject to 
liability irrespective of fault.70 
As Jed Shugerman has shown, Rylands overcame an initially chilly 
reception in American courts partly because of our own experience with 
catastrophic dam failures, including the dam failure that resulted in the 
disastrous Johnston Flood of 1889.71  Fifty years later, the First Restatement 
of Torts generalized out of Rylands the idea of strict liability for injuries 
caused by “ultrahazardous activities,” a category that, in substance, has 
been with us ever since.72  Interestingly, Rylands has probably had greater 
impact in the United States than in England, which has not recognized an 
equivalent to the category of abnormally dangerous activities.  Indeed, in 
2003 the House of Lords declared that Rylands had merely applied nuisance 
law.73 
As noted, the Second Restatement replaced the term “ultrahazardous” 
with the phrase “abnormally dangerous” but otherwise followed its 
predecessor in defining the category by reference to factors found in 
Rylands itself.  Specifically, section 520 lists six factors to be considered in 
determining whether an activity is “abnormally dangerous”: 
(a) existence of a high degree of risk of some harm to the person, land or 
chattels of others; (b) likelihood that the harm that results from it will be 
 
 69. Simpson maintains that Blackburn (and by implication Cairns) decided Rylands with 
an eye firmly on the policy question of what liability courts ought to impose for future 
catastrophic dam failures absent a legislatively created indemnity provision.  He seems to 
treat their invocation of precedents as mere window dressing for a judgment favoring the 
imposition of strict liability purely on policy grounds. Id. at 250–52. 
 70. Id. at 251 (“The legislation [requiring indemnity in the Dale Dyke disaster], though 
relating only to a particular Waterworks Company, may well have been viewed by the 
judges who favored Fletcher’s claim as expressing a general legislative policy.”). 
 71. Jed Handelsman Shugerman, The Floodgates of Strict Liability:  Bursting Reservoirs 
and the Adoption of Fletcher v. Rylands in the Gilded Age, 110 YALE L.J. 333, 358–72 
(2000).  Shugerman further has argued that courts staffed with elected judges, and especially 
elected judges with longer terms, were particularly inclined to embrace Rylands. Jed 
Handelsman Shugerman, The Twist of Long Terms:  Judicial Elections, Role Fidelity, and 
American Tort Law, 98 GEO. L.J. 1349, 1367–78 (2010). 
 72. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS §§ 519–520 (AM. LAW INST. 1938) (recognizing 
strict liability for harms caused by the realization of risks that render an activity 
ultrahazardous, and defining “ultrahazardous” by reference to factors including those 
identified by Rylands v. Fletcher as grounds for imposing strict liability). 
 73. See Transco plc v. Stockport Metro. Borough Council [2003] UKHL 61, [2004] 2 
AC 1. 
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great; (c) inability to eliminate the risk by the exercise of reasonable care; 
(d) extent to which the activity is not a matter of common usage; (e) 
inappropriateness of the activity to the place where it is carried on; and (f) 
extent to which its value to the community is outweighed by its dangerous 
attributes.74 
According to the Third Restatement’s more pithy formulation, an activity is 
abnormally dangerous if “(1) the activity creates a foreseeable and highly 
significant risk of physical harm even when reasonable care is exercised 
by all actors; and (2) the activity is not one of common usage.”75  Today, 
the most common activity to trigger Rylands-style strict liability is likely 
the use of explosives.76  This is no surprise.  Though by no means wrongful 
per se, blasting is a “non-natural” activity that poses an obvious and serious 
danger to neighbors that, at least historically, has not been entirely 
manageable through the use of care.  The activity itself is not wrongful, but 
the harms it brings about are nonetheless an evil. 
B.  Strict Liability Without Wrongdoing 
At least in some applications, liability for abnormally dangerous 
activities is distinctive because its imposition does not turn on a 
determination that the defendant committed a legal wrong.  Of course, one 
could say that the bringing about of physical injury or property damage is 
itself a wrong—after all, without an injury there would not be any liability.  
Rylands, however, is not such a decision, nor are such decisions typically 
found in tort law.  For torts ranging from defamation to trespass, the 
plaintiff’s being injured by what the defendant did is a part of the wrong but 
not the wrong in and of itself.  As we noted above, the various torts 
recognize a duty of noninjury that is qualified by a subduty of 
noninjuriousness.  The subduty identifies prohibited ways of behaving that 
are agent accessible, not simply consequences that are not to be brought 
about.  Causing physical harm without carelessness is not the wrong of 
negligence any more than causing harmful contact without the requisite 
intent is the wrong of battery. 
In Rylands, it is probably significant that the House of Lords was not 
criticizing the Defendant for having created a reservoir.  Similarly, the 
Second and Third Restatements’ use of the phrase “abnormally dangerous” 
is not meant to connote disapproval.  The characterization of the risk level 
as unusually high, while relevant to liability, is not intended to suggest 
these activities are forbidden or ill advised.  On the contrary, building 
reservoirs and using explosives for demolition have generally been 
understood to be permissible and indeed valuable activities. 
 
 74. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 (AM. LAW INST. 1977). 
 75. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL 
HARM § 20 (AM. LAW INST. 2010). 
 76. DAN B. DOBBS, PAUL T. HAYDEN & ELLEN M. BUBLICK, THE LAW OF TORTS § 443 
(2d ed. 2011) (“Strict liability seems most readily imposed when physical harm results from 
the defendant’s use or storage of dynamite or other materials intended to cause explosions.” 
(footnotes omitted)). 
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Fletcher’s claim against Rylands had much in common with a nuisance 
action.  The plaintiff was claiming that the defendant interfered with his 
enjoyment of his real property, without alleging an intentional boundary 
crossing by the defendant.  Moreover, the interference asserted stemmed 
from an activity the defendant undertook on his own property, and the 
defendant was not being accused of behaving in a culpable manner. 
There is nonetheless arguably a crucial difference between Rylands 
liability and nuisance liability.  The court in Rylands seems never to have 
suggested that the defendant was doing something he was not supposed to 
be doing.  There was nothing about the creation of the reservoir that was 
itself invasive, and there is no indication from the Law Lords that the 
defendant was required to stop carrying on his activity in the manner in 
which he had been carrying it out.  Nuisance, as we have seen, turns on the 
idea of a context-inappropriate use of one’s property.  In Sturges, for 
example, the court concluded that the confectioner’s use of loud, vibrating 
equipment attached to a wall shared with his neighbor was impermissible.77  
That use of the equipment was a misuse of the confectioner’s property, i.e., 
a use that exceeded the relatively broad reign given to property owners to 
do what they wish on their properties.78  The claim of a plaintiff suing on an 
abnormally dangerous activity theory is not predicated on the violation of a 
right to be free of injury flowing from a certain kind of conduct by the 
defendant.  It is the damage done, not the property-right invasion, that 
grounds the claim. 
C.  Conditional Permissibility and Licensing 
In so far as Rylands and its progeny impose liability without anything 
that would qualify as wrongdoing, they create an interpretive problem for 
anyone who claims, as we have claimed, that torts are wrongs.  A tenet of 
our “civil recourse” theory is that, through tort law, the state affords to a 
plaintiff a right of action against a defendant only because the defendant has 
wronged the plaintiff.  A right of action is a power to exact a remedy from a 
defendant as redress for having been wronged.  Without a wrong, there is 
no entitlement to a right of action.  Strict liability for injuries inflicted by 
abnormally dangerous activities—if it really is not wrongs-based liability—
breaks the civil recourse mold. 
Still, the most important issue is not one of theoretical defensiveness or 
conceit, but one of simple explanation.  Why does the common law permit 
plaintiffs to recover from defendants in such cases if the defendant has not 
committed a legal wrong against the plaintiff?  Our answer, like that of 
 
 77. Sturges v. Bridgman, (1879) 11 Ch D 852 (Eng.). 
 78. One can imagine a building inspector saying to the confectioner, “You are perfectly 
at liberty to run this business in this location, and to use mortars in doing so.  However, it 
would be wrong to place your mortars along that particular wall:  there’s too much potential 
for disruptive noise and vibration.”  Of course the mere placement of the mortars along the 
wall, without actual interference, would not amount to the tort of nuisance.  Our point is that 
the placement of the mortars in that location provides the kernel of misuse, or inappropriate 
use, that is arguably missing from a case like Rylands. 
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Professors Robert Keeton,79 George Fletcher,80 and Gregory Keating,81 
looks to an idea of fair distribution rather than wrongfulness.  Defendants 
who engage in certain activities unilaterally impose well-known, well-
defined, and substantial risks upon others in a course of conduct that 
(typically) is consciously undertaken for their own benefit.  If such a 
knowing imposition of risk upon others is permitted—if it is not enjoined or 
prohibited—those engaged in the risk imposition must stand ready to 
compensate those injured by it.  The permissibility of this kind of 
extraordinary risk imposition is conditioned on the readiness of the risk 
imposer to take responsibility for the injuries that flow from it, irrespective 
of the presence or absence of wrongdoing. 
Anglo-American law provides several different ways of rendering an 
activity conditionally permissible in this manner.  Licensing, taxing, and 
regulatory approval are three of the most familiar.82  Simpson’s narrative of 
the Parliamentary response to dam failures provides a nice, real-world 
illustration.  The private bills containing Holmfirth clauses quite explicitly 
conditioned permission to build reservoir dams on the engineering 
company’s agreement to pay for any losses caused by dam failure.83 
As Simpson suggested, Rylands can be understood as a common law 
parallel, applicable to private reservoir builders, to the legislative licensing 
regime for public reservoir builders.84  The regime of strict liability 
applicable to builders does not judge the conduct of building a reservoir as 
wrongful or impermissible.  Rather, it insists that the builder stand ready to 
pay for the injuries that flow from it.  The same is probably true of many 
instances of liability for abnormally dangerous activity:  it is permissible to 
engage in the activity, but one must stand ready to pay for the injuries that it 
causes.85 
 
 79. Robert E. Keeton, Conditional Fault in the Law of Torts, 72 HARV. L. REV. 401 
(1959). 
 80. George P. Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARV. L. REV. 537 
(1972). 
 81. Gregory C. Keating, The Idea of Fairness in the Law of Enterprise Liability, 95 
MICH. L. REV. 1266 (1997). 
 82. Simpson, supra note 61, at 231–32. 
 83. Id. 
 84. For a modern decision emphasizing the parallels between licensing schemes and 
liability for abnormally dangerous activities, see Klein v. Pyrodyne Corp., 810 P.2d 917, 
922–23 (Wash.) (en banc), amended by 817 P.2d 1359 (Wash. 1991) (relying both on the 
abnormally dangerous activities doctrine and a state statutory insurance mandate to hold a 
public fireworks operator strictly liable for injuries to patrons injured during a fireworks 
display). 
 85. Some conduct fitting the definition of an abnormally dangerous activity will also fit 
the definition of wrongs-based torts, such as negligence or nuisance.  For example, suppose 
the inclusion of injuries caused by wild animals in the abnormally dangerous activity 
category extends to a case in which a pet tiger escapes from his owner’s suburban home and 
mauls a neighbor, despite the owner having taken care to prevent the escape.  The victim’s 
claim that liability should attach on an abnormally dangerous activity theory would no doubt 
succeed, but the victim might also have a meritorious negligence claim because a reasonable 
jury might well conclude the mere keeping of a tiger for one’s private amusement in a 
residential setting is careless.  There is no reason to suppose, however, that all conduct that 
gives rise to liability under the doctrine of abnormally dangerous activities would also give 
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As indicated above, licensing-based strict liability in the common law 
involves a small set of activities deemed abnormally dangerous.  In Part III, 
we examine some of the reasons for its restricted scope of application, but 
one especially important reason deserves attention here.  The activities that 
generate strict liability in common law are not only abnormally dangerous, 
they are conspicuously so.  Licensing schemes normally emerge ex ante 
from legislatures, regulators, or the market, not ex post through judicial 
rulings.  This is understandable:  ex ante licensing regimes help ensure 
solvency and give fair notice.  Those undertaking the licensed activity are 
aware of their potential liability.  They generate a risk of injury and 
encounter the risk of liability with their eyes wide open. 
Common law licensing-based strict liability lacks these formal ex ante 
features, at least where the courts have not yet spoken authoritatively or 
where doctrine is ambiguous in application.  Some activities are, however, 
ultrahazardous or abnormally dangerous.  The risk of personal injury or 
property damage that these activities pose to others is virtually self-evident.  
Rylands’s building of his reservoir is a good example of such an activity.  
Defendants in these cases perforce recognize that they are, for their own 
benefit, engaging in a particular, well-defined activity that poses hard-to-
consistently-control risks upon others.  Although it is perhaps question 
begging to say that such defendants assume the risk of liability, it is not 
question begging to say that the conspicuousness and magnitude of the risk 
they are taking with respect to others render it fair to require such 
defendants to bear the costs of the injuries they bring about. 
Licensing-based strict liability is in a deep sense both regulatory and 
rights based.  It is regulatory insofar as government officials are exercising 
their prerogative to condition certain activities on the actor’s liability for 
harms generated by the activity.  Underlying the power to so condition 
activities is the power to protect the security of those who are endangered.  
Correlative to the conditioned liberty to act is the right of those who suffer 
harm to hold such risk creators financially accountable for the harm that 
flows from the activities.  As Keating (like Fletcher before him) has argued, 
there are reciprocity and fairness arguments underlying this scheme of 
conditioned liberty.86  However, the scheme is not built around a primary 
right against mistreatment by others.  Rather, it permits the enforcement of 
a right to recover damages that is predicated on a fair scheme of risk 
allocation.  In this sense, too, the normative structure of licensing-based 
strict liability is distinct from the normative structure of wrongs-based strict 
liability.  Although each can be understood as rights based in some sense, 
the latter predicates liability on the defendant’s having wronged the 
plaintiff, whereas the former does not. 
 
rise to a separate wrongs-based claim.  To the contrary, the category clearly extends to 
scenarios that would not give rise to a claim of trespass, nuisance, or negligence. 
 86. Keating, supra note 81. 
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D.  Is Licensing-Based Strict Liability Really Wrongs Based? 
In recent work, Gregory Keating and John Gardner have raised important 
challenges to claims, such as ours, that tort law houses two distinct notions 
of strict liability.  Although on very different grounds from one another, 
each suggests that what we have called “licensing-based” strict liability is 
best understood as a form of wrongs-based liability.  Here, we review and 
respond to their arguments. 
1. Keating on Conditional Wrongs 
Keating’s view is in one way quite straightforward.  He believes a 
significant domain of strict liability (including that which stems from 
abnormally dangerous activities) involves a special kind of wrong—a 
“conditional wrong”—that must be distinguished from a “conduct-based 
wrong.”87 
Conduct-based wrongs express what I shall call primary criticism of 
conduct.  The law lodges its criticism against the infliction of harm in the 
first instance on the ground that the conduct responsible for the harm was 
wrong.  The harm, therefore, should never have occurred.  Strict liability, 
by contrast, predicates responsibility on the judgment that the conduct at 
issue was justified (or reasonable) in inflicting injury, but unjustified (or 
unreasonable) in failing to repair the injury done.  This is secondary 
criticism of conduct.  The law lodges its criticism against harming-
justifiably-without-repairing.  This kind of strict liability identifies a 
conditional wrong.88 
Like us, Keating is quite happy to accept that, in abnormally dangerous 
activities cases, the conduct of the defendant that brings about harm to the 
plaintiff need not be in any sense wrongful.  Nonetheless, contrary to our 
account, he insists that liability in these cases is predicated on a wrong by 
the defendant.  The wrong, as he describes it, is causing harm and then 
failing to make a compensatory payment to the victim. 
For Keating, then, the “wrong” in Rylands lay not in the defendant’s 
doing damage to the plaintiff’s mine, but in the defendant’s unreasonable 
failure to step forward in the aftermath to pay for the damage done.89  For 
torts such as negligence, the wrong is completed at the moment of injury.  
In Rylands, by contrast, at the moment at which Fletcher’s mines were 
 
 87. See Keating, supra note 47, at 301. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Keating holds out as exemplar of conditional wrongdoing not Rylands, but Vincent v. 
Lake Erie Transp. Co., 124 N.W. 221 (Minn. 1910). See Keating, supra note 47, at 302 
(“The wrong in Vincent lay not in the defendant’s doing damage to the dock, but in the 
defendant’s wrongful (or unreasonable) failure to step forward and volunteer in the aftermath 
of the storm to make good the damage done the dock.”).  By contrast, we regard Vincent as 
illustrating the demanding or “strict” nature of the wrong of trespass to land.  In short, 
Vincent holds that an actor who, for good reason, intentionally avails himself of another 
person’s real property without permission commits a trespass. See Vincent, 124 N.W. at 222.  
That the actor acted for a good reason does nothing to defeat the owner’s claim to have 
suffered a wrongful invasion of his property rights. See JOHN C.P. GOLDBERG & BENJAMIN C. 
ZIPURSKY, THE OXFORD INTRODUCTIONS TO U.S. LAW:  TORTS 151 (2010). 
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flooded no wrong had yet occurred.  In a sense, the duty whose breach 
constitutes a wrong only exists once the harm has occurred.  That is why it 
is a conditional duty and the wrong is a conditional wrong.90 
We accept Keating’s view that there is a domain of what are traditionally 
called “tort” cases in which courts impose liability on defendants for 
bringing about harm absent the violation of a norm of conduct.  The 
category of abnormally dangerous activities, we agree, is a category in 
which there is tort liability without what Keating calls a “conduct-based 
wrong.”  And needless to say, once a final judgment against the defendant 
has been issued in such a case, the defendant has, in at least one important 
sense, a legal obligation to pay compensation to the plaintiff.  Our task is 
thus to evaluate Keating’s theoretical move of describing these scenarios as 
involving a form of “conditional wrong.”  Is this description sound?  We 
think not. 
The easiest way to see the untenability of Keating’s account is to imagine 
that Rylands was particularly keen to fulfill his legal duties.  Thus, suppose 
that, as soon as he learned that Fletcher’s mines had been flooded with 
water from his reservoir, Rylands stepped forward and offered to pay for 
the damage.  Rylands’s offer would in no way undermine Fletcher’s right to 
sue for damages.  More specifically, to win his case, Fletcher was not 
required to prove that Rylands failed to offer to pay or that Rylands failed 
to set aside enough funds to cover the cost of damage that might be caused 
by his reservoir failing.  The predicate of liability is the doing of the harm, 
not the doing of the harm plus the failure to step forward to offer to pay. 
There are areas of the law in which the occurrence of harm does trigger a 
duty to offer to pay, or to pay, and in these contexts the failure to comply 
with the duty generates liability.  Insurance law and certain kinds of leases 
provide examples.  Insurers can face liability for failing to pay out once 
they have been made aware that certain harms to an insured have occurred.  
Lessees of land or vehicles commonly have duties of repair for certain 
damage that occurs during the course of their lease.  In these cases, the 
defendant may well have done nothing wrong, but once the harm or need 
for funds arises, a duty can be triggered, without litigation, to pay or offer to 
pay.  A failure to comply with that sort of duty is a certain kind of legal 
wrong, and the relevant beneficiary may thereby have a legal claim against 
the nonpaying party for the failure to step forward and pay.  Failure to pay 
for costs that one should pay for can indeed be the source of liability in the 
law, but that is not what occurs in abnormally dangerous activity cases. 
It is true that a blaster (or flooder) who not only offers to pay, but also 
actually does pay, will typically not face tort liability.  But it is important to 
be clear about why this would be the case.  A conscientious Rylands who 
stepped forward and paid Fletcher would avoid tort liability principally for 
one reason:  any real-world Rylands behaving this way would require a 
written settlement agreement that included a waiver by Fletcher of his tort 
 
 90. As Keating makes clear, the language of conditionality stems from Robert Keeton’s 
classic article. See Keeton, supra note 79, at 418–21. 
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claims.  And it is the waiver, not the payment per se, that would eradicate 
those claims.  If for some reason there were no effective waiver, and if 
litigation ensued, a court probably would offset Rylands’s prior payment 
against any damages awarded.  But this hardly demonstrates Keating’s 
point—it actually shows the opposite.  Any setoff of this sort would be a 
matter of restitution or the law of damages and would presuppose that a tort 
had been committed. 
In short, the problem with Keating’s proposal is not that it is simply 
playing with words to call the nonpayment of compensation a legal wrong, 
for it is actually possible to give meaning to this theoretical assertion.  The 
problem is that when we do actually flesh out the content of what it means 
to call the nonpayment of compensation a legal “wrong” in such cases, we 
see that abnormally dangerous activity liability does not involve 
“conditional wrongs” in Keating’s sense.91 
2.  Gardner on Duties to Succeed 
John Gardner has provided an account of strict liability as pervasively 
duty based.92  One might think this account provides a strategy for 
including Rylands (which Gardner treats as duty based) as a wrongs-based 
tort case.  Moreover, Gardner’s account seems to provide a strategy for 
accommodating all of abnormally dangerous activity liability within the 
domain of liability based on breach of duty.  His account thus seems to 
salvage those parts of tort law we have claimed do not fall within even 
broad notions of wrongs-based liability. 
A great deal of tort law, in Gardner’s view, involves what he calls duties 
to succeed rather than duties to try.  The duty not to trespass on another’s 
land, for example, is not a duty to try to avoid interfering with another 
person’s right to the exclusive possession of their real property; it is a duty 
to succeed in not interfering with the plaintiff’s property right.  While 
negligence law, in his view, actually involves a duty to try not to injure 
others by taking care not to do so, not all torts involving physical harm are 
like this.  Rylands is an example of a case in which liability is predicated on 
the breach of a duty to succeed in not damaging another’s land. 
The key to Gardner’s account lies in his conceptual and moral argument 
against certain criticisms of strict liability.  Surveying a range of putatively 
Kantian-based views of tort law, Gardner takes on two interrelated claims.  
The first is the claim that the moral principle of “ought implies can” 
 
 91. A similar line of argument undercuts an interesting variant on the idea of conditional 
wrongs suggested to us in conversation by Jed Shugerman:  namely, that a defendant who 
engages in abnormally dangerous activity without being adequately insured (or self-insured) 
has committed a wrong.  The flaws in this variant are that (1) our legal system knows how to 
create duties of adequate insurance and how to impose liability for failure to comply with 
such duties, and that is not what is occurring when there is an imposition of liability for 
injuries caused by an abnormally dangerous activity, and (2) nothing in the plaintiff’s case 
hinges on establishing insolvency or lack of insurance. 
 92. John Gardner, Obligations and Outcomes in the Law of Torts, in RELATING TO 
RESPONSIBILITY 111 (Peter Cane & John Gardner eds., 2001). 
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rules out duties to succeed that exceed the range of duties to try.93  The 
second claim is that, as an interpretive matter, a norm demanding that one 
not bring about certain harms must be understood to have content that 
implicitly incorporates a duty to try.94  We shall put Gardner’s treatment 
critique of the first claim largely to one side, noting simply that he (like 
thinkers from Kant to Holmes to Stephen Perry) takes the view that a 
person’s having a general capacity to comply with a norm is sufficient to 
satisfy the “can” for any plausible version of “ought implies can.” 
On the second claim, Gardner’s view seems to be that, once we get 
beyond the mistake of thinking that the “ought implies can” principle 
renders duties to succeed morally problematic, the opponent of such duties 
is simply blinking reality in denying that they are found in tort doctrine.  
Like it or not, our legal system enjoins people from doing certain things or 
bringing about certain harms or interferences, and it holds people 
accountable when they do cause such harms or interferences.  There is 
nothing odd about a normative system—be it law or less institutionalized 
norms of conduct—recognizing rights not to be harmed and imposing 
duties not to harm others. 
Readers should see that, in most respects, we and Gardner are on the 
same page with respect to strict liability.  Like Gardner, we think that tort 
law contains a great deal of objectivity-based strict liability.  Like Gardner, 
we reject the claim that tort law consistently allows good faith or reasonable 
efforts on the part of an actor to defeat liability.  Where Gardner asserts that 
duties in tort law are duties to succeed in not harming others or interfering 
with others, we assert that torts are defined so that persons sometimes 
commit legal wrongs against others notwithstanding reasonable efforts to 
avoid doing so.  If Gardner were to add to his view that a breach of a legal 
duty to succeed (in the torts where there is such a duty) is a wrong, then, at 
least for a broad swath of cases, his view and ours would coincide. 
However, we part ways with Gardner over Rylands and abnormally 
dangerous activity cases.  He treats them as involving breaches of duties to 
succeed and hence places them in the same basket as wrongs such as 
trespass, whereas we maintain that the form of strict liability at work in 
these cases is (at least sometimes) licensing based rather than wrongs based.  
Put differently, his version of (what we call) objectivity-based strict liability 
expands to include liability for abnormally dangerous activities, but our 
version does not.  Why not?  Have we made a mistake by becoming too 
restrictive at this juncture?  Are these not just simply areas of very 
demanding liability, in the objectivity-based sense?  Is Rylands not simply 
an example of liability for breach of the duty to succeed in not harming 
one’s neighbor’s land?  And if so, isn’t harming one’s neighbor’s land a 
legal wrong? 
 
 93. Id. at 118–19 (arguing that the ought-implies-can principle applies equally to duties 
to try and duties to succeed and thus is not a distinct ground for rejecting duties to succeed). 
 94. Id. at 118. 
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Our answer has two interrelated parts:  one relating to a possible gap 
between the concept of a legal duty and the concept of a legal wrong and 
one relating to a cluster of ideas that courts express when they invoke the 
category of strict liability for abnormally dangerous activities.  First, as to 
duties, the concept of a legal duty famously gets content at two different 
ends.  From a Hartian perspective, legal duties exist where there are (valid) 
legal rules that impose them.  Such rules are, by their nature, directive or 
injunctive.  The duties in tort law, as Gardner and we understand them, 
always correlate to rights in plaintiffs.  The basic picture is this:  there is a 
rule enjoining mistreatment and a corresponding right not to be so 
mistreated.  Tort law is set up so that the breach of the primary duty and 
right generates a (secondary) right to recover damages or some other 
remedy. 
If this is all one pours into the concept of a duty, then Gardner is perhaps 
correct that there is conceptual room to say that abnormally dangerous 
activity liability involves genuine duties to not cause harm to others.  
However, the above account is both suspect and vague.  We need to ask 
what it means for a rule to exist that is directive or injunctive.  From a 
Calabresian view, it may be sufficient that the rules are understood to be 
connected to plaintiff-empowering rules that generate liability when the 
putative duty is breached.  Our point in calling torts “wrongs,” however, is 
to suggest that tort law contains norms of conduct designating some acts as 
“wrongs,” and those norms have a kind of directive force that is not 
reducible to their connection to liability rules.  It is of course open to us to 
stipulate that we do not count rules as duty-imposing rules unless they have 
this extra directive force.  Or we could concede that such rules are duty 
imposing but assert that the breaches of such duties do not count as wrongs.  
In prior work we have overwhelmingly allowed duties and wrongs to travel 
hand-in-hand, and we shall do so here, therefore taking the former route of 
saying that Gardner’s account is too reductive if it supposes that legal duties 
possess injunctive force merely by virtue of being connected to liability. 
We agree with Gardner that some duties in law and morality are duties to 
succeed and that actors are often unable to secure compliance with such 
duties by reasonable efforts.  However, we think that the norms that impose 
such duties are injunctive in a sense that goes beyond the fact that 
noncompliance can generate liability.  Consider again the standard case of 
trespass to land.  The norm that one is not to interfere with another’s 
exclusive possession designates such interferences as “not to be done” and 
communicates that such interferences are wrongful acts toward others.  The 
law’s systemic empowerment of individuals to redress such interferences is 
predicated on those interferences being wrongs in this sense.  The fact that 
care does not necessarily secure compliance does not undercut the 
classification of the interference as “not to be done” or wrongful.  This is 
the core of our point about the existence of strict liability wrongs. 
In contrast to the law of trespass, there is a feature of abnormally 
dangerous activity liability (say, blasting) that stands in the way of applying 
the model just articulated.  Liability of this sort goes beyond liability for 
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injuries brought about by a failure to use reasonable care.  Indeed, these are, 
by definition, activities with the intrinsic capacity to bring about harm so 
long as they are conducted at all, no matter what precautions are taken.  
And yet it is also built into the idea of such activities that courts are openly 
treating those activities as “to be done” or permissible, rather than “not to 
be done” or impermissible.  When they impose liability for harms caused by 
careful blasting, courts are therefore not designating “injuring by engaging 
in the activity” as “not to be done” in any sense not reducible to liability 
rules (there is nothing else it could mean).  Of course, they do designate 
“injuring by engaging in careless blasting” as something that is not to be 
done.  But in the cases with which we are concerned, the whole point is that 
a plaintiff may recover without proving that the defendant injured her by 
failing to use sufficient care.  The upshot is that when our legal system 
imposes liability in an abnormally dangerous activity case, it is not 
predicating liability on the defendant’s having committed a legal wrong. 
Gardner offers what appears to be an appealing account of abnormally 
dangerous activity law, but its appeal involves collapsing two very different 
ideas under the duty-to-succeed umbrella.  Tort law does impose on blasters 
a duty to succeed in not injuring others, and the duty is in some ways quite 
strict.  The law of negligence, after all, instructs that it is impermissible to 
injure another through careless blasting, where carelessness is measured on 
an objective standard that is largely insensitive to any difficulties a 
particular actor might face in meeting it.  Apart from the law of negligence, 
there is also—thanks to the doctrine of abnormally dangerous activities—
liability for blasting even where legally mandated care is taken.  In this 
sense, tort law recognizes both a qualified duty not to injure through a 
failure to take precautions while blasting (negligence), as well as an 
unqualified duty not to cause injury by blasting (abnormally dangerous 
activity liability).  It is tempting to run these two distinct grounds of 
liability together by saying, simply, that tort law for blasting involves strict 
liability, where strict liability means liability for breach of a demanding 
duty to succeed.  If one then adds to this thought the idea that the breach of 
the duty to succeed is a legal wrong because it results in liability, one might 
seem to have refuted the argument that abnormally dangerous activity law 
involves tort liability without wrongs. 
As we have argued above, the problem with this line of analysis is that it 
conflates two different senses of “duty”—one that depends on the existence 
of norms designating certain acts as not to be done and one that counts as 
duty imposing solely by virtue of linking conduct of a certain description to 
liability.  Where the liability system for blasting depends on the existence of 
duty in only the second sense, as we have argued that it does when the 
plaintiff relies on the abnormally dangerous activity doctrine, the law is not 
in fact predicating liability on breaches of a norm designating certain acts as 
wrongs.  Because negligence-based liability in such areas designates 
objectively careless injuring through blasting as wrongs, it is tenable to say 
that the law recognizes a duty to succeed in a more robust sense of duty.  
However, the acts of defendants that generate liability under the rule for 
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abnormally dangerous activities are not breaches of that duty, but of the 
other, thinner kind of duty.  Even if they do generate liability, those acts are 
not wrongs. 
III.  OBJECTIONS AND REPLIES 
Here we identify and rebut four objections to our analysis:  (1) that we 
have mischaracterized tort doctrine in asserting that licensing-based strict 
liability is anomalous, (2) that tort law’s identification of strict liability 
wrongs renders tort law morally indefensible, (3) that there is no basis for 
placing licensing-based liability for abnormally dangerous activities within 
the domain of tort law, and (4) that an instrumentally rational tort law 
would include wide swaths of licensing-based strict liability rather than a 
tiny sliver. 
A.  The Doctrinal Objection: 
 Is Products Liability Wrongs-Based or Licensing-Based? 
Those who take the view that tort law recognizes broad swaths of 
licensing-based strict liability will by now be impatient with us.  For we 
have yet to consider the part of tort law they might well regard as the most 
obvious and important exemplar of such liability—namely, strict products 
liability.  We have postponed consideration of that doctrine until now so 
that we could sharpen the distinction between strict liability wrongs and 
licensing-based strict liability. 
In the mid-1960s the California Supreme Court95 and the Second Torts 
Restatement96 adopted the doctrine of strict products liability to supplant 
negligence and warranty as the grounds of liability for product-related 
injuries.  Per Justice Roger Traynor’s opinion for the California court in 
Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc.,97 a plaintiff would henceforth 
stand to recover by proving that “he was injured while using the 
[manufacturer’s product] in a way it was intended to be used as a result of a 
defect in design and manufacture of which plaintiff was not aware that 
made the [product] unsafe for its intended use.”98  In the Second 
Restatement, William Prosser emphasized that this form of liability “applies 
although . . . the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and 
sale of his product.”99 
Among the grounds proponents cited in favor of adopting strict products 
liability was that it would allow tort law to function as a kind of insurance 
mechanism, whereby the losses suffered by victims of product-related 
injuries could be spread among all consumers of the product, or perhaps 
among an even broader pool through a seller’s liability insurer.  For 
 
 95. See Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963). 
 96. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (AM. LAW INST. 1977). 
 97. 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963). 
 98. Id. at 901. 
 99. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A(2)(a) (emphasis added). 
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example, in his earlier Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co.100 concurrence, 
which helped pave the way for the eventual adoption of strict products 
liability, Traynor reasoned as follows: 
Those who suffer injury from defective products are unprepared to meet 
its consequences.  The cost of an injury and the loss of time or health may 
be an overwhelming misfortune to the person injured, and a needless one, 
for the risk of injury can be insured by the manufacturer and distributed 
among the public as a cost of doing business.101 
Given that products liability doctrine is prepared to hold commercial 
sellers of products liable for injuries even when they exercise “all possible 
care,” that it was implemented in part out of a desire to create a loss-
spreading mechanism, and that it is a centerpiece of modern tort law, it is 
understandable that many regard it as “Exhibit A” in favor of a view of tort 
as a law of liability, not wrongs.  And yet this would be a mistake. 
Consider a defendant held liable to a plaintiff on a products liability 
theory.  The plaintiff will have to prove that the defendant sold a product in 
a dangerously defective condition and that she was injured by the 
realization of that danger.  The defendant who sells a defective product that 
injures a consumer violates a standard of conduct.  And the standard is not 
simply “do not injure a consumer.”  The standard is “do not injure a 
consumer by sending into commerce a dangerously defective product.”  
From Escola forward, defect has always been essential to liability.102  A 
seller faces no liability when its sound product causes an injury to a 
consumer; there is no wrong in selling a sound product even if it injures 
someone.  Sellers instead are charged with a duty to protect consumers 
against dangers associated with defective products, and their failure to do so 
renders their conduct wrongful. 
Of course, what makes products liability strict is that a plaintiff can 
prevail without proof of seller carelessness.  Indeed, a plaintiff can prevail 
even if there is affirmative evidence that the seller took “all possible care” 
to prevent a defective product from entering commerce.  As we saw in the 
discussion of battery, trespass, defamation, and nuisance, the mere fact that 
liability is imposed on diligent actors hardly warrants the conclusion that 
such liability is not wrongs based.103  Faultless (“strict”) wrongs are 
commonplace in tort.  A rule of liability for injuries caused by a seller’s 
defective product is just another example of a rule that defines wrongdoing 
on demanding or unforgiving terms. 
Products liability law today distinguishes three types of defects:  
manufacturing defects, design defects, and failure to warn.  The latter two 
are—and perhaps always have been—quite plainly wrongs based.  Indeed, 
 
 100. 150 P.2d 436 (Cal. 1944). 
 101. Id. at 441 (Traynor, J., concurring). 
 102. Id. at 440 (“[I]t should now be recognized that a manufacturer incurs an absolute 
liability when an article that he has placed on the market, knowing that it is to be used 
without inspection, proves to have a defect that causes injury to human beings.” (emphasis 
added)). 
 103. See supra Part I. 
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since the mid-1980s, for better or worse, courts and commentators have 
increasingly insisted that, for these kinds of defects, the law of products 
liability sets a standard of conduct with fault-like features.  Indeed, the 
products liability provisions of the Third Torts Restatement, published in 
1998, insist that these forms of liability turn on proof that the plaintiff’s 
injury was a foreseeable result of a negligence-like failure by the seller to 
adopt an available, well-defined alternative design or warning.104  One may 
question whether, as an interpretive matter, the Third Restatement too 
readily assimilates liability for design defect and failure to warn with 
liability for negligence.  Indeed, we are inclined to conclude that it does.105  
The point remains that it is a wrong—even if not exactly the wrong of 
causing injury through carelessness—to injure another through the sale of a 
product that has an unsafe design or inadequate warnings.  Injurious 
conduct of this sort was cogently conceived of as wrong even prior to the 
renewed emphasis on fault that has come with the modern tort reform 
movement. 
Liability for manufacturing defects—for example, a glass bottle that is 
weaker than it should be according to its own design standards, a food item 
with a foreign object in it, or a car that comes off the assembly line missing 
a component necessary for its brakes to function properly—is perhaps the 
best candidate for a licensing-based form of strict liability.106  Indeed, it 
might seem that this branch of products liability law operates on the same 
basis as liability for abnormally dangerous activities.  It is not wrong to 
engage in the mass production of consumer products.  And it may be 
inevitable that mass production will allow some products to leave the 
seller’s custody in a defective condition, even if the seller takes care.  
Accordingly, when it comes to liability for manufacturing defects, liability 
seems to be licensing based rather than wrongs based.  In effect, the law 
seems to say to product sellers:  “You are free to engage in the mass 
production and sale of consumer products on the condition that you stand 
ready to pay for any injuries caused by a product containing a 
manufacturing defect.” 
While certain judges and scholars have taken this view of manufacturing 
defect liability, it is far from clear that the licensing-based model best fits 
this category.  As noted above, one could say of a competent surgeon or 
driver that, sooner or later, each is bound to engage in careless surgery or 
driving.  This observation might diminish the blame that attaches if and 
when such carelessness occurs, but it need not, and typically does not, 
undercut the treatment of the careless conduct as a violation of a norm—
 
 104. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2(b)–(c) (AM. LAW INST. 
1998). 
 105. If so, it is perhaps in part because the Restatement Reporters, like so many other 
mainstream torts scholars, falsely equated wrongs-based liability with fault-based liability. 
 106. The Third Restatement states that manufacturing defect liability is strict rather than 
fault based, though the Reporters suppose that this branch of products liability law will often 
function in a manner akin to the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, allowing plaintiffs to hold 
liable manufacturers who were in fact careless without offering proof of that carelessness. 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 cmt. a. 
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i.e., as the wrong of negligence.  Nor do we ordinarily suppose that, simply 
by virtue of isolated careless action (even careless action that causes injury), 
the surgeon should no longer be permitted to engage in surgery or the driver 
should be required to cease driving.  Both remain permitted to engage in 
these activities notwithstanding that, in the course of pursuing them, they 
might commit wrongs.  Similarly, the law of large numbers may tell us that 
a mass manufacturing process, even when implemented with rigorous 
safety protocols, will inevitably lead to the sale of products that contain 
manufacturing defects.  Recognition of this inevitability is perfectly 
compatible with treating the sale of a defective product that causes injury as 
a wrong.107 
Strict products liability was advocated and adopted on several mutually 
supporting grounds.  As noted above, an insurance rationale was among 
these.108  According to that rationale, strict liability is warranted for 
product-related injuries because manufacturers tend to be better situated 
than injury victims to absorb and spread the costs of their injuries.109  The 
presence of this rationale might seem to suggest that at least some courts 
that adopted strict products liability did so on the specific understanding 
that products liability, or at least manufacturing defect liability, would not 
be wrongs based, but instead policy driven and licensing based. 
Even granting that courts adopted, or today maintain, parts of strict 
products liability on an insurance rationale, the argument from rationale to 
characterization is unsound.  The same reasoning could readily support the 
adoption of a wrongs-based notion of strict products liability.  When judges 
contemplate rendering certain torts strict (in the sense of more demanding 
or less forgiving), they need not, and typically do not, ignore relevant 
practical considerations.  Quite the opposite, they will usually look for 
practical reasons (along with precedential and other reasons) that support 
the imposition of strict liability.  If the adoption of a scheme of defect-based 
products liability promises improved loss spreading, then improved loss 
spreading is a reason for the courts to recognize a new wrong—the wrong 
of injuring another through the sale of a dangerously defective product. 
We can make a slightly more qualified version of this last point.  Below, 
we note that a somewhat paradoxical advantage of demarcating the fault 
line between licensing-based and objectivity-based strict liability is that it 
allows certain difficult judgments to be finessed.110  Strict products 
liability—particularly liability for manufacturing defects, but also liability 
for design and warning defects under certain conceptions of 
 
 107. In addition, the idea that the sale of some defectively manufactured products is an 
inevitable by-product of mass manufacturing does not mean that dangerously defective 
products are inevitable.  For example, defective plastic bottles do not carry the same risks as 
defective glass bottles. 
 108. See Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963); supra notes 
91–98 and accompanying text. 
 109. Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 441 (Cal. 1944). (Traynor, J., 
concurring). 
 110. See infra Part III.B. 
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defectiveness111—come close to the line, precisely because the standard in 
such cases is so unforgiving.  Often there will be nothing a seller can do to 
avoid committing this particular wrong.  It would not be surprising to find 
that the judges who crafted and implemented this very demanding standard 
of conduct took some comfort in the law’s recognition of licensing-based 
liability for abnormally dangerous activities.  They may have reasoned, 
even if we are pushing wrongs-based liability to the limits, it can 
alternatively be justified as licensing-based strict liability.112 
B.  The Normative Objection:  
The Strict Liability in Fault Is Indefensible 
Tort law, we claim, is filled with strict liability wrongs.  This observation 
naturally invites questions as to why tort law’s standards are so demanding 
and whether they should be.  The answers to these questions, though not 
identical, are related.  Obviously judges long ago concluded, and continue 
to maintain, that it is appropriate to treat batteries, trespasses, libels, 
nuisances, and careless injurings that involve no fault on the part of the 
defendant as actionable civil wrongs.  Since the 1960s, courts have said the 
same about injuries caused by the commercial sale of defective products.  
Why? 
It is natural for judges, or at least modern judges, to consider the 
pragmatic or instrumental value of different tort rules for achieving social 
ends.  Indeed, we noted above that some proponents of strict products 
liability explicitly invoked justifications such as the deterrence of 
undesirable conduct and the compensation of injury victims. 
But a concern for goals of these sorts cannot fully explain the law’s list 
of torts or why they are defined in sharp-edged ways.  Battery, trespass, 
defamation, nuisance, and negligence are the names of torts because, first 
and foremost, each tracks (and helps reinforce) familiar social norms about 
how each of us is obligated to interact with others.  These norms are not 
some arbitrary collection but are connected to other norms and values that 
 
 111. For example, some courts have applied a hindsight-based version of the risk-utility 
test, according to which design defect or failure to warn liability can attach for product-
related injuries even if the risks that render the product defective could have been discovered 
only after the time of manufacture and sale.  A famous, if isolated, example of the use of 
such a test in the New Jersey courts is Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 447 A.2d 
539, 546–47 (N.J. 1982), where the court rejected the defendant’s efforts to invoke a “state 
of the art” defense to plaintiffs’ failure to warn claims.  A jurisdiction with courts that are 
genuinely committed to the use of this sort of test is one whose products liability law is (at 
least in some applications) dancing on, or even crossing over, the line between objectivity-
based and licensing-based strict liability. 
 112. Our core claim in this section is interpretive.  It maintains that, for the most part, the 
states’ adoption of the doctrine of strict products liability has involved the adoption of 
wrongs-based rather than licensing-based strict liability for product-related injuries. In 
making this expressly qualified claim, we are also recognizing that some jurisdictions for 
some categories of products liability cases are probably best interpreted as having adopted 
licensing-based strict liability or having finessed the issue as described above.  Nothing we 
have said is meant to imply that states lack the authority to adopt licensing-based strict 
liability schemes for product-related injuries. 
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have long been central to notions of a law-governed, liberal society.  While 
there are some exotic entries, the basic list of torts is hardly a source of 
surprise.  Law students are not shocked to learn that the law treats a punch 
in the nose, an unwanted caress, a physical invasion of property, an act of 
malpractice, or the circulation of false statements about a person that are 
likely to cause harm to her social standing as actionable wrongs.  
Throughout their lives they have been told that these ways of interacting 
with others are wrongful.  Even somewhat more esoteric torts, including 
products liability, tend to resonate with familiar notions of responsibility 
and wrongdoing.  The idea that a company that injures consumers through 
the sale of a dangerously defective product has failed to meet a basic and 
important responsibility is hardly counterintuitive to nonlawyers. 
What we have said to this point helps to explain why we have the torts 
that we have.  Remaining to be explained, however, is why these wrongs 
are defined so as to set demanding standards of conduct.  In fact, there are 
several reasons to conclude that judges have been on solid ground in so 
defining them.113 
First, tort law’s use of broad notions of wrongdoing satisfies certain 
desiderata associated with the effort to set standards of conduct through 
law, particularly standards incorporated in duties of noninjury.  Take 
negligence, for example.  There are benefits to having the standard of care 
articulated as a standard that requires the actual exercise of reasonable care 
on a given occasion, as opposed to best efforts to exercise such care, or a 
record of having exercised such care.  Judges and juries can more easily 
administer it.  It communicates the law’s expectations for conduct in a 
relatively clear manner—we are told, simply, to be careful rather than to 
make best efforts to be careful.  It sets an aspirational standard that 
encourages care and discourages excuses.  “A system of norms that uses 
success verbs to define required conduct and failure verbs to define 
impermissible conduct sends a stronger message about how society expects 
its members to behave.”114 
More fundamentally, when standards of conduct are being set within a 
body of law that is first and foremost concerned with enjoining forms of 
mistreatment and empowering victims of such mistreatment to respond to 
those who have mistreated them, there is reason to set them in a manner that 
is appropriately attentive to the interests of potential victims.  A patient who 
is injured by a surgeon’s careless error is justified in considering herself to 
have been wronged by the surgeon.  In other contexts, the fact that the 
surgeon is generally very reliable, and that the surgeon was doing her best, 
might well counsel against a finding of wrongdoing.  For example, it is 
highly unlikely that a surgeon who was careless in this way would face 
criminal sanctions.  This is in part because, as “public” rather than “private” 
wrongs, crimes are generally defined to require greater culpability than 
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torts.  Yet facts pertaining to the surgeon’s character and disposition, even 
if sufficient to fend off a criminal prosecution, do not suffice to undermine 
the patient’s claim of mistreatment and the patient’s entitlement to a 
response from the surgeon, whether in the form of an apology or 
compensation.  Of the surgeon, she may justly complain:  “Your failure to 
perform with the required competence, resulting in harm to me, was a 
wrongful injuring of me.  For that, I am entitled to demand something of 
you.” 
One might plausibly suppose that strict liability wrongs provide a clear 
instance in which law departs from morality.115  Indeed, today it is common 
to suppose that legal norms have an artificial aspect associated with their 
positivity or “enactedness”—this is in part how they are distinguished from 
moral norms.  Yet it is not clear that the strictness of legal norms is 
traceable to their status as enacted law.  For it may be that moral norms are 
best understood in terms of a deinstitutionalization and deobjectification of 
norms of conduct that are, in the first instance, entrenched, institutionalized, 
and objectified much in the manner of the norms of tort law.  In other 
words, it may be that, in morality no less than in tort law, there are duties of 
noninjury that give rise to strict liability wrongs.  If so, then the strictness of 
the legal wrongs of tort law would not mark the sort of anomalous 
phenomenon that requires an elaborate explanation and defense. 
A related worry is that tort law, understood as a law of wrongs, is 
destined to be narrow, static, reductionist, and overly moralistic.  But this 
concern is fueled by (and indeed part and parcel of) the failure to grasp 
what it means for tort law to recognize strict liability wrongs.  As shown by 
liability for innocent trespasses, excused negligence, reasonable nuisances, 
and carefully-manufactured-but-nonetheless-defective products, the concept 
of tortious wrongdoing is capacious and varied, not cramped or 
reductionist.  Torts constitute a “gallery of wrongs.”116  They are united in 
requiring injury resulting from a failure to meet a standard of conduct, 
while allowing for considerable variety both with respect to what can count 
as an injury and what sort of standard one is expected to meet. 
For much the same reasons, it would be false to assert that a view of torts 
as wrongs is inherently moralistic in a pejorative sense.  To isolate the 
presence of strict liability wrongs in tort law is to demonstrate that the 
commission of a tort often will not warrant strong forms of condemnation 
or blame.  Each tort involves a failure to live up to a standard of conduct, 
but many such failures are understandable and forgivable to a substantial 
degree.  While tort law allows special remedies for victims of aggravated 
wrongs (most notably, punitive damages), it is primarily concerned with 
accountability for wrongdoing.  Torts frequently are a matter of “not 
delivering” or “falling down on the job,” rather than acting maliciously or 
 
 115. See, e.g., Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 459–
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flouting the rules.  One can thus embrace the idea that torts are wrongs 
without adopting a finger-wagging disposition, much less a punitive one. 
Finally, there is nothing in the foregoing analysis to suggest that, as 
conditions change, legislatures or courts are precluded from recognizing 
new wrongs or from defining them broadly.  This much is obvious from the 
emergence in the twentieth century of new common law torts such as 
invasion of privacy, intentional and negligent infliction of emotional 
distress, and strict products liability, as well as new statutory torts such as 
securities fraud and workplace discrimination.  In each instance, new 
wrongs were recognized out of concern that extant law was failing to 
address certain forms of injurious misconduct and the undesirable 
consequences they generated. 
C.  The Taxonomic Objection:  
Why Treat Rylands as a Tort Case? 
In our view, it is in some sense a mistake for legal academics and courts 
to treat Rylands (understood as having adopted a licensing-based 
conception of strict liability) and liability for abnormally dangerous 
activities as a part of tort law.  After all, torts are wrongs, and these 
instances of liability are not predicated on wrongdoing.  Yet courts do treat 
Rylands and its progeny as tort cases.  In this section, we aim to explain the 
senses in which Rylands both does and does not belong in the category of 
tort and to do so in a manner that is genuinely synthetic rather than a bit of 
doublespeak. 
Tort law is, in almost all of its applications, a law of wrongs.  A tort 
plaintiff’s right to recover is contingent on her proof that the defendant (or 
its agent) committed a legal wrong upon her.  Yet the recognition of strict 
liability for abnormally dangerous activities demonstrates that, at least in 
the United States, there are tort claims not predicated on wrongdoing.  Even 
granting that this exception is intelligible—that there is something 
distinctive about injuries caused by such activities that warrant the 
imposition of liability without wrongdoing—a taxonomic question remains:  
why has liability for these activities been treated as tort liability? 
Here we must refine our metaphor of the fault line within strict liability.  
We have relied on that metaphor to suggest that the difference between 
wrongs-based and non-wrongs-based strict liability is sharp and of great 
significance.117  And so it is.  To cross the fault line is to alter 
fundamentally the basis for a defendant’s liability.  Yet there are also 
respects in which the line is quite subtle.  Indeed, it is one that courts and 
commentators have frequently ignored or glossed over.  Rylands itself is a 
testament to the fact that certain forms of licensing-based liability are 
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simultaneously discontinuous and continuous with wrongs-based 
liability.118 
It is significant that Rylands itself was pleaded and argued as a case of 
wrongs-based liability.119  It is equally significant that the judges who 
favored liability in that case declined to distinguish sharply between the 
case before them and precedents involving liability for negligence, trespass, 
and nuisance.120  The plaintiff in Rylands came very close to establishing 
the commission of a traditional tort—some would say that he succeeded.  
The builder Rylands hired to construct the reservoir may well have been 
careless, for example.  However, any such carelessness could not be 
imputed to Rylands because the builder was hired as an independent 
contractor.121  The defendant’s flooding of the plaintiff’s mine also had 
some of the qualities of a trespass (the physical invasion) and a nuisance 
(the interference with the plaintiff’s use).122  In his Rylands opinion, Justice 
Blackburn suggested that a decision to hold the defendant liable was 
consistent with a general principle of justice that he took to be implicit in 
prior decisions imposing liability for trespass and nuisance. 
Many subsequent courts and commentators have suggested that, at least 
in hindsight, Rylands ought to be understood as imposing wrongs-based 
liability—that it is best reconstructed as an application of the nondelegable 
duty doctrine (under which the independent contractor’s fault could be 
charged to the defendant) or as an application of nuisance law.123  But there 
is another way to interpret the “near miss” aspect of the case.  Assuming 
that the plaintiff could not quite make out a claim for a wrongs-based tort 
instead helps to explain why the House of Lords in that case was entitled, 
and other courts in comparable cases are entitled, to include their 
imposition of licensing-based liability for injuries caused by abnormally 
dangerous activities under the umbrella of tort.  Claims for injuries caused 
by abnormally dangerous activities, like claims grounded in negligence or 
nuisance, assert that the plaintiff has a right to compensatory damages from 
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the defendant because the defendant undertook an activity that caused 
injury to the plaintiff.  It is barely a stretch, if it is a stretch at all, to describe 
the plaintiff in Rylands as bringing a “personal injury claim” for 
compensatory damages.  The basis of this form of liability is not a 
wrongfully inflicted injury but rather the realization of a risk of injury 
associated with a permitted, nonwrongful activity.  But in other respects the 
claim resembles a personal injury claim predicated on a wrong.  It is thus 
unsurprising that it should have been placed within the rubric of liability for 
wrongs. 
A critic could attempt to turn the foregoing observations against us.  
Insofar as courts treat claims for damages based on abnormally dangerous 
activities as tort claims notwithstanding the absence of wrongdoing, doesn’t 
this cut against our claim that torts are wrongs?  Wouldn’t it be more 
accurate to say that the category of torts extends to acts, wrongful or not, 
that cause loss and hence give rise to claims for compensation?  Wouldn’t 
this recasting of tort solve the taxonomic problem posed by Rylands and its 
progeny in a simpler, more elegant fashion? 
Unfortunately, an effort to describe the subject matter of tort as acts 
causing compensable losses would create more taxonomic problems than it 
would solve.  Although all torts involve an injuring, the tort concept of an 
injury is much broader than the concept of a loss.  There are many torts 
without losses, including, for example, harmless trespasses.  Likewise, tort 
claims often give rise to forms of relief that do not involve compensating 
losses, including nominal damages, punitive damages, and injunctive relief.  
For these reasons, one cannot solve the puzzle of the place of Rylands 
within tort law by redefining tort to be the law of (noncontractual) 
compensable losses. 
Just as the close resemblance of licensing-based liability for abnormally 
dangerous activities to wrongs-based liability helps to explain why courts 
and commentators might have been led to misconceive of the former as 
wrongs based, it also allows courts to claim a particular institutional 
competence to handle them under the heading of tort.  Assessing a claim for 
compensation for injuries caused by abnormally dangerous activities 
requires the receipt of evidence and the application of legal rules to a 
sequence of issues.  These include whether the activity is abnormally 
dangerous, whether a dangerous aspect of the activity proximately caused 
the plaintiff’s injury, and whether the plaintiff was comparatively at fault.  
Such questions are appropriately dealt with through the usual litigation 
process and by courts employing standard tort procedures. 
To be sure, liability for losses caused by abnormally dangerous activities 
might be imposed through different institutions and in many ways.  
Workers’ compensation schemes, which also implement a licensing-based 
form of liability, obviously rely more heavily on administrative 
proceedings.  So too does New Zealand’s accident compensation system124 
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and, in our legal system, the program established by the National Childhood 
Vaccine Injury Act.125  Indeed, as we have noted, Rylands itself was 
preceded by, and arguably influenced by, private acts of Parliament that 
conditioned permissions to build dams on the builder or operator of the dam 
standing ready to compensate persons injured by a dam failure.126  And yet 
there is enough in common between wrongs-based and licensing-based 
claims to compensation to render reliance on litigation and adjudication a 
viable institutional choice. 
More affirmatively, there may be good practical reasons for our legal 
system to continue to include, under the same umbrella, a special case of 
licensing-based liability alongside genuine wrongs-based liabilities.  In 
particular, it is not always easy to say when an injury has been caused by 
wrongful or nonwrongful activity.  As to some highly risky activities, 
plaintiffs assert that the risk level of the activity renders it unreasonably 
dangerous or negligent, or they assert that the defendant’s manner of 
conducting the activity was negligent.  Some juries and judges might be 
inclined to agree with such assertions, others may not, and others might 
remain undecided.  This is frequently true of entrepreneurial enterprises like 
those in Rylands, for example.  Strict liability for abnormally dangerous 
activities allows for the imposition of liability without a unified decision as 
to whether certain conduct falls below the line of reasonable prudence.  In 
this way, licensing-based strict liability gives courts some leeway to impose 
liability without making a decision as to whether the conduct was wrongful 
or nonwrongful.  One might argue that the opinions of Blackburn and 
Cairns in Rylands equivocated in just this way.127  Given that there is 
sometimes uncertainty as to the wrongfulness of a defendant’s conduct, it is 
perfectly sensible to include licensing-based liability within a body of law 
overwhelmingly concerned with liability for wrongs.  When courts invoke 
licensing-based strict liability in cases of uncertainty, they are, in effect, 
using licensing-based liability to paper over the fault line in strict liability. 
D.  The Instrumental Objection:  Licensing-Based Strict Liability 
Should Be the Rule, Not the Anomaly 
For tort theorists such as ourselves, there is an initial feeling of relief 
attached to the conclusion that there is enough of a resemblance between 
genuine torts (which are wrongs based) and non-wrongs-based strict 
liability for abnormally dangerous activities to explain how they came to be 
lumped together under the heading of tort law and, indeed, to explain why 
there are certain advantages that come from coupling the one form of 
liability to the other.  Similarly, it initially seems reassuring to discover 
 
 125. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-22(b)(1). 
 126. See supra Part II.A. 
 127. Cf. HOLMES, supra note 7, at 117 (suggesting that Rylands’s holding reflected the 
courts’ recognition that there are “limit[s] to the nicety of inquiry which is possible in a 
trial,” and their judgment that the safer course was “to throw the risk upon the person who 
decides what precautions shall be taken”). 
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reasons for allowing certain causes of action for damages to proceed even in 
the absence of a wrong by the defendant. 
However, the sense of relief quickly evaporates when we realize that the 
analysis of the preceding section generates a new puzzle.  If it is sometimes 
justifiable to use tort law’s mechanisms to impose liability on defendants 
for injuries they have caused nonwrongfully, why does tort law have so 
little licensing-based liability?  Why this much, but no more?  If there are 
considerations of fairness that justify licensing-based liability for a small 
slice of the harms that risk creators cause to innocent victims, why are those 
considerations insufficient to justify tort liability for all of the injuries that 
risk creators cause to innocent people?  Perhaps it is true that licensing-
based strict liability currently attaches to only an isolated set of activities.  
But is this aspect of tort doctrine really justifiable? 
It is worth briefly reviewing and rejecting three familiar efforts to answer 
these questions.  The first and most obvious is suggested by the First 
Restatement’s phrase “ultrahazardous activities.”128  One could argue that 
certain activities, such as blasting with dynamite, are simply “off the charts” 
in their riskiness, and therefore persons and entities should not be allowed 
to take such risks unless they stand ready to compensate the victims for 
their injuries. 
This answer is unilluminating for numerous reasons.  First and foremost, 
it is far from obvious that the risks presented by what the law has deemed 
abnormally dangerous activities actually fall into that category.  Second, 
even if they did, it is unclear why an extraordinary risk would generate such 
liability but a large risk should not.  Third, there are some rather 
extraordinary risks that do not generate such liability. 
A second unsatisfactory answer (famously advocated by George 
Fletcher) is that many activity-related risks that otherwise should be 
governed by licensing-based strict liability fall out of that category because 
victims have assumed them, at least insofar as they are generated by these 
activities even after the exercise of due care.129  Driving automobiles is 
risky, just as blasting is, but almost all of us use the roadways, while few of 
us engage in blasting.  In a world of mutual or reciprocal risk causing, we 
all assume the risk associated with nonnegligent driving.  It is the 
asymmetrical quality of blasting or keeping a reservoir that prevents the 
mutual assumption of risk model from ratcheting the liability standard up to 
negligence.130  The idea that licensing-based strict liability derives from 
nonreciprocal risk imposition seems to garner support from the Second 
Restatement’s use of the phrase “abnormally dangerous activities,” and 
from its emphasis on the lack of “common usage” as critical to determining 
whether strict liability will apply.131 
 
 128. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS §§ 519–520 (AM. LAW INST. 1938). 
 129. See Fletcher, supra note 80, at 548. 
 130. Id. at 546. 
 131. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 (AM. LAW INST. 1977) (emphasis added). 
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Alas, the reciprocity model has justly been subjected to withering 
criticism.  Its central problem is that one cannot make the model work 
without expanding the reach of the idea of assumed risks in ways that are 
untenable or ultimately self-defeating.  To take the automotive example, the 
world is full of pedestrians, cyclists, and nondrivers who do not impose 
reciprocal risks on car drivers, yet cannot avail themselves of strict 
liability.132  If one tries to fend off this counterexample by arguing that such 
persons benefit more broadly from the operation of cars, one confronts a 
parallel argument about reservoirs and blasting being beneficial to the 
public in general. 
Lord Cairns’s reference to “non-natural activities” in his Rylands opinion 
provides a third apparent ground for delimiting the reach of licensing-based 
strict liability, one which shares the emphasis on nonreciprocity without 
relying on the idea of assumed risks.133  Normal activities trigger liability 
only when done wrongfully because our system treats individuals as 
entitled to engage in those activities so long as they are careful about the 
risks posed to others.  Imposing liability for injuries caused, but not through 
wrongs, would burden these activities, and yet actors have done nothing to 
warrant that burden.134  By contrast, there are certain activities that generate 
risks beyond those characteristic of everyday life and generate substantial 
risks to others even when done carefully.  As to these, we are ambivalent 
about whether such risky enterprises should be permitted, and we are not 
taken by the idea that they must be permitted as a matter of course.  Thus, 
we accommodate both our desire to permit these activities and our 
misgivings about their risks by requiring those engaging in such activities to 
stand ready to pay for the losses they cause.  On this view, the principal 
reason for not broadening the class of activities subject to licensing-based 
strict liability is that doing so fails to recognize a clean entitlement to 
engage in activities about which we are not ambivalent (so as long as one 
undertakes them with reasonable care). 
This line of thinking is of course highly schematic, both because it does 
not specify the activities in which we have an unburdened entitlement to 
engage, why we are so entitled, or what sort of extra liability provisions will 
actually constitute an undue burden on them.  That it is schematic is a 
shortcoming insofar as it provides less illumination, but a strength insofar 
as it permits the answers to the latter questions to be fleshed out in different 
ways.  Is it critical that individuals be regarded as enjoying an unburdened 
right to drive an automobile, so long as they drive carefully?  Why?  Is it 
because of the importance of freedom of movement, because of a right to 
work, because a legislature has said so, or simply because of the realities of 
 
 132. Jules L. Coleman, Justice and Reciprocity in Tort Theory, 14 W. ONT. L. REV. 105, 
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 133. See Stephen R. Perry, Responsibility for Outcomes, Risk, and the Law of Torts, in 
PHILOSOPHY AND THE LAW OF TORTS 72, 114–15 (Gerald J. Postema ed., 2001) (suggesting 
that abnormally dangerous activity liability is generated by risks that arise from outside of 
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modern life?  Is the right to be free of the burden that strict liability would 
carry contingent on how great a burden it will impose?  Is it contingent on 
whether liability insurance is available, and at what cost?   
However one might flesh out the answers to these questions, the answer 
will not go far enough to satisfy a critic of our account.  The problem is that 
there are many activities that go beyond what anyone would regard as 
“natural use” and go beyond what would seem to be a good case for a 
“clean entitlement” to engage in the activity.  Operating a cement factory, 
transporting chemicals, and manufacturing airplanes are all such activities, 
and yet we do not have licensing-based strict liability for them.   
It is important to recognize at this juncture a distinction between domains 
in which licensing-based liability should be regarded as an option for our 
legal system and domains in which it is not only an option but also an 
actuality.  Like Judge Richard Posner, we have no trouble accepting that 
licensing-based liability for the transportation of certain dangerous 
chemicals is in principle a possibility.135  It is not a natural use; it is not 
something for which there is a “clean” entitlement; it may not be feasible to 
remove all possibility of harm by careful performance; it is highly risky; it 
is something that, at least in principle, could be insured.  The choice of 
whether to select such a form of liability when available invites attention to 
a flood of other considerations:  the extra costs that such activities will 
generate, the ability to pass along such costs, the possible reduction in 
activity level, the possible simplification of litigation, the added availability 
of compensation for those injured, the cost of alternative means of making 
available such compensation, and so on.  Common law courts have come 
out in different places for different candidates for licensing liability, and so 
have legislatures.  Like Jules Coleman136 and John Gardner,137 and unlike 
Ernest Weinrib,138 we see no reason to think that courts should 
categorically exclude such instrumentalist considerations in determining 
whether to deviate from the wrongs-based mold where licensing-based 
liability is available as a matter of principle. 
Notwithstanding this recognition of the relevance of instrumental 
considerations to the decision about whether to adopt a licensing-based 
strict liability rule for injuries caused by certain activities, or perhaps 
because of it, we regard ourselves as having an explanatory debt, at least to 
the following extent.  Our “civil recourse” theory puts wrongs-based tort 
liability front and center, and seems only to concede as an afterthought that 
there might be some room for non-wrongs-based liability within the 
common law of torts.  But we then seem to add that it is only because of a 
mélange of instrumentalist considerations that non-wrongs-based liability 
does not extend even further, and we back away from refining that mélange.  
Our openness to non-wrongs-based liability from a normative point of view 
seems anomalous alongside our overall commitment to the essential place 
 
 135. Ind. Harbor Belt R.R. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 916 F.2d 1174 (7th Cir. 1990). 
 136. See COLEMAN, supra note 49. 
 137. See Gardner, supra note 92. 
 138. See WEINRIB, supra note 4. 
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of wrongs within the law of torts.  Surely there must be reasons that lead us 
to think not just that wrongs-based liability is the paradigm of tort law but 
that it should remain so. 
And, indeed, there are.  Tort law includes, but does not center upon, 
liability for accidents one has caused through highly risky activity.  Tort 
law overwhelmingly consists of norms of conduct that, when breached, 
empower victims to recover from the breaching party—the wrongdoer.  It 
turns out that some litigation today stems from accidents that were not 
brought about by legal wrongs yet still find a place within our liability 
system.  A seemingly progressive inclination has motivated such 
developments, for licensing-based liability compensates victims who might 
otherwise have had no means or limited means of self-repair. 
The retreat from wrongs carries its own perils, however.  Tort law plays 
an important role in our legal system beyond determining who shall be held 
accountable to whom when cases are litigated.  Tort law’s primary rules of 
conduct, prohibiting people from wronging one another, constitute an 
important repository of norms of conduct.  They are not pure liability rules; 
they go hand in hand with an assessment of conduct as violative of a 
standard of conduct that is well accepted and conventional.  Such norms are 
at least designated as standards of conduct by official sources and applied as 
such by fact-finders in trials, by lawyers guiding their clients, and by legal 
actors striving to comply with the law.  They are not pure abstractions, mere 
ideals of how one is expected to treat others.  They are enforceable, for they 
by and large determine when legal actors are vulnerable to demands for 
damages from putative victims, what sorts of structures one’s lawyers and 
insurers will be requiring one to abide by, and so on. 
Licensing-based liability and wrongs-based liability can function 
reasonably well side by side, we believe, when wrongs-based liability is the 
lead actor and licensing-based liability plays a minor supporting role.  This 
is especially so when licensing-based liability is identified and 
conceptualized in terms of outliers—when it is treated like certain versions 
of promissory estoppel, quantum meruit, or unconscionability within 
contract law.  No doubt there are parts of our system that do not quite fit a 
model we wish to have for a variety of systemic reasons—a model that 
hangs together in a relatively stable manner but cannot itself accommodate 
all the disputes we would wish to accommodate in a manner that sits well 
with our overall set of values and goals.  There is no strong a priori reason 
to rule out the possibility of a subsidiary domain of rules and principles, one 
that operates on a different but not wholly unrelated set of rationales.  
Licensing-based strict liability for abnormally dangerous activities is just 
such a subsidiary domain. 
If licensing-based liability should grow too much in size or in 
prominence relative to wrongs-based liability, it may be that the role of tort 
law in our society will change.  Two kinds of change have been hailed as 
positive:  the increase in compensation to those who are in need, and the 
increase in deterrence of risk generators.  However, there is a downside as 
well, and we do not mean here the cost increases that are alleged by 
786 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85 
contemporary tort reformers to accompany the expansion of tort liability.  
To the extent that tort law is experienced and understood to be disconnected 
from standards of conduct, its capacity to guide conduct and its place as a 
repository of norms may be greatly diminished.  In short, if lawyers as 
litigators, in a spirit of enhancing compensation, treat tort law as generally 
having nothing to do with wrongs, only with compensation, we must 
reconcile this with the reality that we will lose credibility when, as 
counseling lawyers, we advise that the rules of tort law are not mere 
liability rules, but are standards of conduct.  To the extent that licensing-
based liability is merely a sidekick, we do not imperil our own standing to 
speak of tort law as a law of wrongs, but if the roles are switched, that 
standing is lost. 
The same considerations that cause us concern over the prospect of 
seriously weakened notions of wrongdoing and accountability also point 
toward practical considerations that ought to bear on and guide efforts at 
tort reform (assuming they are to be undertaken).  Precisely because tort 
law is a law of wrongs, and not a law of liability rules, legislation that cuts 
back on tort law threatens to undermine notions of responsibility for 
wrongdoing.  Other things being equal—for example, absent evidence that 
the tort law in question is subject to widespread misapplication or abuse—
tort reform should be done narrowly.  If there is reason to think tort law is 
interfering with certain medical practices, such as OB/GYN, the reform 
should target its application to those practices, not malpractice law 
generally.  Moreover, if tort law is to be displaced from a domain of 
activity, as negligence law was by the adoption of workers’ compensation, 
there is reason to favor replacement schemes that carry with them at least a 
reflection of tort-like notions of wrongdoing and responsibility.  Workers’ 
compensation liability is not tort liability; it is not wrongs based.  
Nonetheless, it, unlike a more general first party insurance scheme, operates 
on terms that retain the notion that employers bear a particular 
responsibility for the safety of their employees. 
CONCLUSION 
One is entitled to ask what is at stake in gaining a proper handle on the 
place of strict liability in tort.  In fact, the stakes are potentially significant.  
We conclude by focusing on four domains of potential impact. 
First is the domain of torts scholarship and teaching.  As we noted at the 
outset, torts professors have, for more than a century now, largely organized 
their understanding of the subject around the distinction between strict and 
fault-based liability.  Yet because they have been prone to mischaracterize 
the distinction, they have been prone to pose misleading questions for 
themselves and their students.  For example, if one recognizes what we 
have called “the strict liability in fault,” then the much debated historical 
question of whether liability under the old trespass writs was strict or fault-
based seems poorly framed.  In all probability, liability under the writs, like 
liability today, was fault-based and strict.  Then, as now, one could be held 
liable for a blameless bit of negligence, an innocent trespass, a nuisance 
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without fault, and a conversion committed under duress.  It was only in the 
mid-nineteenth century that the English courts, through Rylands, arguably 
recognized a conditional, non-wrongs-based form of strict liability.  Such 
liability remains exceptional to this day. 
Second is the domain of judicial decision making.  More specifically, 
there is the question of judicial authority to reform tort doctrine.  The 
failure to appreciate what we have dubbed “the fault within strict liability” 
permits scholars substantially to overstate the degree to which tort law 
already recognizes liability without wrongdoing and, in turn, the leeway 
judges enjoy to recognize new variants of licensing-based strict liability (as 
opposed to objectivity-based forms of strict liability).  Indeed, it is 
sometimes argued that, given the objectivity of negligence law’s ordinary 
prudence standard, the longstanding recognition of vicarious liability, and 
the adoption of strict products liability, the courts have already broadly 
endorsed liability without wrongdoing.139  It would seem to follow that 
judges would simply be doing what they have always done if they were to 
decide to implement additional licensing-based strict liability in the name of 
objectives such as deterrence and compensation. 
In fact, as we have demonstrated, there is little precedent for judicial 
recognition of licensing-based forms of strict liability.  Rylands and its 
progeny are really the only example, and Rylands—as we have explained—
sits right on the fault line between objectivity-based and licensing-based 
strict liability.  One can hardly infer from this very special, borderline case 
that judges have historically wielded, and therefore are entitled to wield, 
broad authority to implement licensing-based strict liability.  It is far more 
plausible to assert that they enjoy such authority at the margin—an 
authority they have arguably exercised in the case of strict liability for 
manufacturing defects. 
Third is the domain of legislation.  When it comes to tort reform, 
legislatures have substantially greater room to maneuver than courts.  Thus, 
it is in principle open to them to substantially displace current tort regimes 
of wrongs-based liability with forms of licensing-based strict liability, 
whether in the name of economic equality, efficiency, or justice.  Should 
they? 
Without purporting to be able to offer a definitive answer to this complex 
question, we would suggest that our analysis sheds needed light.  For 
example, legislators must appreciate the type of choice they would be 
facing:  what it is that they are reforming, and hence what it is they would 
be gaining and losing by engaging in reform.  It may be that, on balance, 
there are reasons to move to licensing-based schemes, at least with respect 
to certain activities that produce injuries on a recurring basis.  But this 
should not obscure the fact that certain tradeoffs will have to be made.  Any 
gain in efficiency or justice would come at the cost of diminishing the 
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extent to which the law establishes norms of interpersonal conduct and 
enables persons to hold others accountable for violations of those norms.  A 
world with fewer wrongs-based torts is a world that is less about the duties 
that we owe one another, and less about the rights we enjoy against each 
other, and more about the aggregate distribution of costs and benefits. 
Finally, there is the domain of political and legal culture.  For several 
decades now, those on the progressive side of debates about law have 
tended to be those who are suspicious of law that focuses on wrongs and 
responsibilities.  To assign liability exclusively on the basis of wrongdoing, 
the thinking goes, is to precommit to a liability regime that is far too narrow 
to bring about systemic goods such as deterrence and compensation.  
Likewise, to emphasize responsibility is to arm potential defendants with 
too many grounds for avoiding liability, either by establishing their lack of 
fault, by blaming victims, or some combination of the two.  We will do 
better, on this view, to resolve the problems associated with injuries and 
losses as problems of distributive justice or aggregate welfare. 
We believe that there is something to be said for these instincts.  Yet we 
also believe that they easily are overstated.  Tort law’s standards of conduct, 
as we have explained, are often quite demanding of defendants and 
protective of victims.  Law that holds persons and firms strictly to their 
interpersonal obligations makes for a good deal of responsibility and 
liability, including forms of responsibility of which progressives tend to 
approve.  This, we believe, is the main lesson of the rise of strict products 
liability.  It is a body of law that holds commercial sellers accountable to 
product users for their wrongs, yet does so on the basis of a strict and 
therefore expansive notion of what counts as a wrong.  While it may be true 
that even expansive regimes of wrongs-based tort liability will be narrower 
in scope than licensing-based liability, it hardly follows that tort is properly 
described as imposing liability on narrow or unduly moralistic terms. 
Moreover, in an era in which prospects for progressive legislation are 
dim and in which progressives can sometimes fairly be criticized for being 
inattentive to notions of individual responsibility, it is hardly obvious that 
the right way for progressives to proceed is by advocating for the 
displacement of tort law by schemes of compensation or deterrence.  By 
holding persons and firms to demanding norms of conduct, tort law 
arguably strikes a more politically viable and sensible balance. 
